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A Primer on Hobby Lobby: For-Profit 
Corporate Entities’ Challenge to the HHS 
Mandate, Free Exercise Rights, RFRA’s 
Scope, and the Nondelegation Doctrine 
Terri R. Day,* Leticia M. Diaz,** and Danielle Weatherby*** 
Abstract 
Earlier this term, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument 
in the consolidated case of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the first of 
a litany of cases in which for-profit business entities are invoking the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in support of their claims that 
the Affordable Care Act’s Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate (the 
Mandate) violates their freedom of religion.  In particular, these plaintiffs 
argue that the Mandate’s requirement that employer-provided health 
insurance cover the costs of contraceptives, the “morning after” pill, and 
other fertility-related drugs conflicts with their deeply held religious belief 
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that life begins at conception and is, therefore, unconstitutional.  While the 
Mandate does exempt religious employers from this requirement, it does not 
excuse all secular, for-profit corporations from complying simply because 
their officers, founders, or directors may have religious beliefs that conflict 
with the Mandate’s provisions. 
Authors Day and Diaz were sitting just feet away from the advocates 
during the riveting Hobby Lobby oral argument.  One question by Justice 
Kennedy piqued their interest in the nondelegation doctrine and the 
principle of separation of powers as they apply to the Mandate.  As the first 
academic article authored during the crucial time between oral arguments 
and the Court’s decision, this Article breaks down the complex legal issues 
and provides a solid dose of common sense in analyzing what will ultimately 
be a decision with momentous and far-reaching consequences. 
First, this Article sets the stage for the Court’s forthcoming decision by 
providing some background and insight into the parties’ arguments, the 
history of free exercise jurisprudence, and RFRA—the centerpiece of Hobby 
Lobby’s claim.  The Article poses critical and timely questions, such as 
whether this decision will reinstate or expand the pre-Smith standard for 
assessing religious exercise claims and whether Hobby Lobby, as a for-
profit commercial business, has standing under RFRA to bring a free 
exercise claim. 
Second, this Article deconstructs the complexities of RFRA, providing a 
step-by-step analysis of its legal framework.  It first provides a 
comprehensive overview of the dense “substantial burden” inquiry, which 
asks whether the government has imposed a substantial burden on the 
plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.  Then, it outlines and analyzes the strict scrutiny 
standard applied in RFRA cases. 
Next, the Article simplifies the complex and less widely discussed 
nondelegation doctrine and addresses the dangerous trend spreading 
countrywide, in which states are enacting their own RFRA laws to exempt 
religious employers from complying with public accommodation laws.  
These exemptions essentially condone a new wave of discrimination that 
gives wedding vendors and other businesses license to refuse service to 
same-sex couples or homosexual patrons. 
Lastly, the Article cautions that, in the wake of Hobby Lobby and the 
other RFRA cases, where the clash between religion, politics, and the law 
have met head-on, the Court must be cautious not to set a dangerous 
precedent that would shield for-profit, secular businesses from liability when 
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they fail to comply with public accommodation laws based on their asserted 
religious beliefs.  Not only do we face a crucial crossroad in this country’s 
free exercise jurisprudence, but we also risk overlooking an impermissible 
delegation of legislative authority, which, when coupled with deference to 
administrative decision-making, threatens the constitutional structure and 
separation of powers.  An accretion of administrative agency power—the 
headless fourth branch of government—threatens all of our rights, not just 
religious freedom. 
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I. PREFACE 
Prior to the submission of this Article, the Supreme Court decided 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.1 and Wheaton College v. Burwell.2  
 
 1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that the Mandate as 
applied to closely held corporations violated RFRA), aff’g Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 
723 F.3d 114 (10th Cir. 2013), and rev’g Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t 
of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).  On April 11, 2014, Kathleen Sebelius 
resigned as Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and on that date, President 
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These decisions do not render the authors’ article moot or less relevant.  
Instead, the decisions strengthen the authors’ unique focus on the 
nondelegation doctrine.3  As the administration scrambles to consider 
options to provide contraceptive coverage to thousands of women, who will 
now be denied the benefits of the Mandate due to their employers’ religious 
beliefs,4 the next legal battles will be exactly as the authors predict.  Scores 
of pending cases raising claims under the First Amendment and the 
Administrative Procedure Act5 (APA) will raise the critical issues 
surrounding the nondelegation doctrine. 
While making different points in their separately authored Hobby Lobby 
opinions, both Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg hinted at Congress’ 
inappropriate delegation of decision-making authority to an administrative 
agency.6  In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded that the 
accommodation afforded to the nonprofit religious entities should be applied 
to Hobby Lobby.7  He reasoned “an agency such as HHS” cannot 
discriminate “between different religious believers.”8  In her dissent, Justice 
Ginsburg stated her concern about commercial employers imposing their 
religious beliefs on employees and, consequently, depriving them of the 
benefits provided by the Mandate.9  She opined that Hobby Lobby 
employees should not be deprived of benefits “available to workers at the 
shop next door, at least in the absence of directions from the 
Legislature . . . .”10 
 
Obama named Sylvia Burwell as her successor.  Julie Pace & Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Obama 
Announces Sebelius Resignation, Successor, CONCORD MONITOR, Apr. 12, 2014, 
http://www.concordmonitor.com/home/11549187-95/obama-announces-sebelius-resignation-
successor.  Thus, the named party in these cases changed from “Sebelius” to “Burwell.”  
 2. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) (granting preliminary injunction against 
enforcement of the self-certification procedure established as an accommodation to nonprofit 
religious entities allowing them to opt out of the Mandate requirement). 
 3. See discussion infra Parts IV–V. 
 4. Robert Pear & Adam Liptak, Obama Weighs Steps to Cover Contraception, N.Y. TIMES, July 
5, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/us/politics/obama-weighs-steps-to-cover-contraceptio 
n.html?_r=0. 
 5. See discussion infra Part V. 
 6. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785–86 (Kennedy, J, concurring); id. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J, 
dissenting). 
 7. Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 2804. 
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As discussed more fully below,11 the Mandate and agency-created 
regulations providing exemptions and accommodations to those entities 
wishing to opt out for religious purposes, regardless of whether they are 
arbitrary and capricious under the APA,12 demonstrate the unraveling of a 
government initiative when Congress delegates to an administrative agency 
the hard choices of legislating policy.  This is especially true when the 
policy choices involve controversial issues and ones that raise constitutional 
concerns.  In an addendum to this article, the authors discuss the Supreme 
Court opinions and how those opinions strengthen the force of the two main 
points articulated in the following article.13  First, the Mandate represents an 
inappropriate delegation of legislative authority to an unaccountable, 
unelected administrative body.14  Second, the Court’s conclusion in Hobby 
Lobby that a sincerely held religious belief impacted by a neutral 
government regulation automatically satisfies the substantial burden prong 
of RFRA will open the door to discrimination.15  
II. INTRODUCTION 
There was a sense of nervous excitement in the U.S. Supreme Court as 
Chief Justice Roberts signaled the Court’s readiness to hear the oral 
argument in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.16  People had lined up 
 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a challenged agency regulation promulgated 
pursuant to Congress’ explicit delegation of authority will be upheld unless the action is found to be 
arbitrary and capricious.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009); see also 
Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Bleeeeep! The Regulation of Indecency, Isolated Nudity, and 
Fleeting Expletives in Broadcast Media: An Uncertain Future for Pacifica v. FCC, 3 CHARLOTTE L. 
REV. 469, 485 (2012).  However, a finding that a regulation is not arbitrary and capricious does not 
preclude a constitutional challenge.  See infra Part IV.  Indeed, the cases discussed in this Article 
raise First Amendment challenges to the Mandate as well.  See infra Part IV; see also Autocam 
Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 627–28 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom, Autocam Corp. v. 
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901, 2901 (2014).  While the Court has determined that the Mandate violates 
RFRA as to a closely held corporation, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785, other employers may 
further unravel the Mandate, a “signature piece” of Obamacare, by successfully claiming the 
Mandate violates the nondelegation doctrine.   
 13. See infra Part VIII. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See infra Part VI. 
 16. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (ruling on the consolidated cases of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 723 F.3d 114 (10th Cir. 2013), and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. 
Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), which were consolidated on 
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outside the Supreme Court for days before the actual oral argument.17  It was 
reported that interested parties paid others to hold their place in line.18  The 
atmosphere was reminiscent of lines of shoppers thronged in front of Best 
Buy, camping out on a cold November night before “Black Friday,” hoping 
to be one of the lucky few to purchase the newest generation of high-tech 
equipment at bargain prices,19 or lines of die-hard fans waiting to purchase 
Bruno Mars tickets.20 
Although the decorum inside the Supreme Court on March 25, 2014,21 
was far from the push and shove of retail shopping or the deafening sound 
decibels of pop music concerts, the ultimate decision in these cases will have 
reverberating effects, touching the lives of Americans—as employers, 
employees, and consumers of goods and services.  Much has been written 
about the Sebelius22 and Conestoga Wood23 cases.24  There is a plethora of 
law review articles discussing the legal issues,25 a slew of information based 
 
appeal).  See supra note 1 (explaining the change in party names).   
 17. Authors Day and Diaz were in Washington, D.C., and observed firsthand the line of people 
forming around the Supreme Court on Sunday, March 23, 2014, three days before oral argument. 
 18. Authors Day and Diaz were sworn into the Supreme Court bar on March 24, 2014.  
Personnel in the Clerk’s Office confirmed the practice of paying for “line place-holders,” a practice 
that is common in high profile Supreme Court cases.   
 19. See, e.g., Ann Hoevel, Why Black Friday Shoppers Endure the Crush, CNN (Nov. 22, 2012, 
7:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/21/living/secret-of-black-friday/. 
 20. See Jesse Lawrence, Could “The Bruno Mars Act” Change the Way Tickets are Bought for 
High Demand Concerts?, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2014, 12:13 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jesselawrence/2014/02/12/could-the-bruno-mars-act-change-the-way-
tickets-are-bought-for-high-demand-concerts/. 
 21. Oral argument was on Tuesday, March 25, 2014.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 678 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-246), argued, Sebelius 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., and Conostoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius. 
 22. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
 23. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 
F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) , rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014). 
 24. In this Article, any reference to Hobby Lobby is intended to include the Sebelius and 
Conestoga Wood cases, unless the authors expressly distinguish the two cases. 
 25. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, The Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving a Sensible 
Balance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1 (2014); Mark L. Rienzi, Unequal Treatment of Religious 
Exercises Under RFRA: Explaining the Outliers in the HHS Mandate Cases, 99 VA. L. REV. IN 
BRIEF 10 (2013); Willis J. Stevens, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2013); Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, The Union of 
Contraceptive Services and the Affordable Care Act Gives Birth to First Amendment Concerns, 23 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 539 (2013); Jeremy M. Christiansen, Note, “The Word[] ‘Person’ . . . 
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on partisan opinions and political views,26 and “average” citizens’ comments 
posted on blogs.27  This Article will not attempt to provide exhaustive 
coverage of the issues or a prediction of the Court’s decision.  Rather, it is 
meant to deconstruct the legal complexities and discuss some of the legal, as 
well as practical, consequences of a decision favoring Hobby Lobby. 
Part III provides background on these first cases to reach the Supreme 
Court.  Part IV presents a “primer” on this recent challenge to the Mandate, 
examining Hobby Lobby’s and the Government’s opposing arguments.  This 
section discusses the Mandate, RFRA, and the multiple challenges 
circulating in the federal courts.28  During oral argument, Justice Kennedy 
 
Includes Corporations”: Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Protects Both For- And 
Nonprofit Corporations, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 623 (2013); Recent Case, First Amendment—Free 
Exercise of Religion—Tenth Circuit Holds For-Profit Corporate Plaintiffs Likely to Succeed on the 
Merits of Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise Claim—Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 
723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. REV. 1025 (2014); Christopher S. Ross, Note, Shall 
Businesses Profit if Their Owners Lose Their Souls? Examining Whether Closely Held Corporations 
May Seek Exemptions From the Contraceptive Mandate, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1951 (2014); 
Jonathan T. Tan, Comment, Nonprofit Organizations, For-Profit Corporations, and the HHS 
Mandate: Why the Mandate Does Not Satisfy RFRA’s Requirements, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1301 
(2013). 
 26. See, e.g., Hal C. Lawrence, III, Women’s Health: A Priority, Not an Afterthought, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 8, 2014,  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hal-c-lawrence-iii-md/hobby-
lobby-contraception-case_b_5028051.html; Adam Serwer, Hobby Lobby’s Contraception 
Hypocrisy, MSNBC (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/hobby-lobbys-
contraception-hypocrisy; Charmaine Yoest, Why Hobby Lobby Case Matters—White House Hides 
Anti-Life Agenda in ObamaCare, FOX NEWS (Mar. 25, 2014), 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/03/25/why-hobby-lobby-case-matters-white-house-hides-
anti-life-agenda-in-obamacare/. 
 27. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby = Radical Right Wing Hypocrisy, A PENIGMA – A MYSTERY, UNDER 
A PSEUDONYM (Apr. 3, 2014), http://penigma.blogspot.com/2014/04/hobby-lobby-radical-right-
wing-hypocrisy.html; Gryphen, Hobby Lobby Hypocrisy Alert, THE IMMORAL MINORITY (Apr. 2, 
2014), http://theimmoralminority.blogspot.com/2014/04/hobby-lobby-hypocrisy-alert.html; Nelson 
Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Reply to McConnell on Hobby Lobby and the 
Establishment Clause, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 30, 2014), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/reply-
to-mcconnell-on-hobby-lobby-and.html.  
 28. Not-for-profit, religious institutions object to the Mandate because, as they argue, the 
Affordable Care Act requires them to provide contraceptives to their employees, either directly or 
through a third party, with the threat of severe penalties for failing to do so.  Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Class Certification & Memorandum in Support at 4–6, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, No. 13–
CV–2611-WJM-BNB, 2013 WL 6839900 (D. Colo. Dec. 27, 2013).  Fifty-three non-profit lawsuits 
have been filed, with thirty-one injunctions granted.  THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
HHS MANDATE INFORMATION CENTRAL: LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE HHS MANDATE (2014) 
[hereinafter BECKET FUND, HHS MANDATE INFORMATION CENTRAL], available at 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/.    
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questioned the constitutional basis upon which Congress could delegate to 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) the authority to grant 
religious exemptions.29  Although not presently an issue in the case, the 
initial authority to promulgate the Mandate, which potentially violates 
constitutional rights, is subject to attack under the nondelegation doctrine.  
Part V of this Article suggests that Congress’ “punting” of the controversial 
issue of mandated free health insurance coverage for contraceptives to HHS 
insulates Congress from voter accountability and violates the nondelegation 
doctrine.  While the legislative accountability issue may be a purely 
academic concern, opponents of Hobby Lobby’s position raise the real-
world concern of the slippery slope.  Part VI addresses the concerns raised 
by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan in the Hobby Lobby oral argument,30 the 
legal challenge raised in Elane Photography, LLC. v. Willock,31 and the 
recent legislative attempts to “legalize” violations of public accommodation 
laws in the name of religious freedom. 32 
In conclusion, Part VII proposes some common sense considerations.  
Our Founding Fathers intended to create a wall of separation between church 
and state by adopting the First Amendment balance, which allows 
individuals to freely exercise religion to the extent those individuals do not 
burden other people’s rights,33 and prevents the government from 
establishing religion.34  While this “wall” is not impenetrable, if the 
government mandates national standards for health insurance coverage, 
religion should not play a factor.  The overall goal of the Affordable Care 
Act was to increase access to health insurance coverage and to reduce 
 
 29. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 56. 
 30. Id. at 4. 
 31. 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).   
 32. The Governor of Arizona recently vetoed Arizona Senate Bill 1062 (2014); furthermore, 
Mississippi law, Miss. S.B. 2681 (2014), state Religious Freedom Restoration Act, defines “person” 
as “all public and private corporations.”  See, e.g., Zack Ford, Legislature Passes ‘Religious Liberty’ 
Bill That Legalizes Discrimination Against Gay People, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 2, 2014, 9:03 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2014/04/02/3421938/mississippi-religious-discrimination/.  Opponents 
say this law will allow companies to violate public accommodation laws (for example, bakers and 
photographers not wanting to provide services for same-sex marriages) based on religious beliefs.  
Id.  Although the Arizona law faced the Governor’s veto, and similar bills in Georgia, Ga. S.B. 377 
(2013), Idaho, Idaho H.B. 427 (2014), Maine, Me. L.D. 1428 (2013), and Ohio, Ohio H.B. 376 
(2013), have failed, similar bills are still pending in Missouri, Mo. S.B. 916 (2014), and Oklahoma, 
Okla. H.B. 2873 (2014). 
 33. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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costs.35  To effectuate those goals, decisions of health insurance coverage 
should be driven by economics.  Prior to the Affordable Care Act and its 
mandates, the issue of employer-provided insurance coverage for 
employees’ reproductive needs was a decision of the economic marketplace 
and the doctor–patient relationship.  Unfortunately, an attack on the 
Affordable Care Act has transformed into a religious war. 
III. BACKGROUND 
Hobby Lobby, an arts and crafts chain, operates 514 stores and employs 
13,240 full-time employees.36  Owned and operated by the Green family, 
Hobby Lobby is incorporated as a closely held S-corporation.37  In addition 
to its arts and crafts stores, the family owns a chain of 35 Christian 
bookstores that employ approximately 400 employees and operate under the 
name of Mardel, Inc.38  Both corporations are for-profit businesses and 
operate according to the Greens’ religious tenants.39  For instance, statements 
of purpose for both chains include the family’s intention to conduct business 
“in a manner consistent with Biblical principles,”40 all stores in the Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel, Inc. chains are closed on Sundays,41 and customers hear 
Christian music playing in the store while they shop.42 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel operate their business through a management 
trust; the Greens are the trustees, and religious principles guide the trust.43  
“A Trust Commitment,” which the trustees are obligated to sign, contains an 
 
 35. See 156 CONG. REC. E618–04 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2010) (statement of Rep. Jerry McNerney). 
 36. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d, 
723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014).   
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2766.  Hobby Lobby’s statement of 
purpose includes “[h]onoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a manner consistent 
with Biblical principles.”  Id. at 2770 n.23.  Mardel asserts that it is “a faith-based company 
dedicated to renewing minds and transforming lives through the products we sell and the ministries 
we support.”  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013).   
 41. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2766.   
 42. Brief for Respondents at 9, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 
13-354), decided sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 43. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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oath to “maintain a close intimate walk with the Lord Jesus Christ by 
regularly investing time in His Word and prayer.”44 
As a result of the Affordable Care Act, Hobby Lobby and its affiliate 
Mardel are required to comply with a provision of the Act to provide 
“preventive care and screenings” for women without cost-sharing “‘as 
provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources 
and Services Administration [HRSA].’”45  Because guidelines did not exist 
when Congress passed the ACA, HHS sought advice from the Institute of 
Medicine to determine what services and treatments should be included in 
the no cost, mandated “preventive care and screenings” for women.46  One of 
the recommendations of the Institute included “‘[a]ll Food and Drug 
Administration [FDA] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with 
reproductive capacity,’ as prescribed by a provider.”47 
HHS adopted this recommendation.48  Now, “employment-based group 
health plans covered by ERISA . . . must include FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods.”49  Hobby Lobby objected on religious grounds to 
four of the twenty FDA-approved contraceptives required by the Mandate.50 
According to Hobby Lobby, the Mandate’s required coverage for 
contraceptives that “risk destroying a human embryo”51 places a substantial 
burden on its free exercise rights.52  Faced with the choice to comply, which 
compels Hobby Lobby to act contrary to its religious beliefs or face 
substantial fines,53 Hobby Lobby and the Greens filed suit in federal district 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)).   
 46. See id. at 1123.   
 47. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 4 (discussing 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 
2012)). 
 48. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d at 1123. 
 49. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (2006 & Supp. 5) (mandating 
that group health plans offered as employment benefits and governed by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) must provide preventive health services). 
 50. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d at 1123.  Specifically, Hobby Lobby 
objected to “[f]our of the twenty approved methods—two types of intrauterine devices (IUDs) and 
the emergency contraceptives commonly known as Plan B and Ella.”  Id.  It is any contraceptive 
device that “risks destroying a human embryo” to which Hobby Lobby objects.  Brief for 
Respondents, supra note 42, at 34–35. 
 51. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 34–35. 
 52. Id.   
 53. Id.   
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court.54  The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction and challenged the 
Mandate under RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
and the APA.55 
Meanwhile, Conestoga Wood Specialties (“Conestoga”), one of the 
largest manufacturers of wood doors and kitchen and bath furniture, and the 
Hahn family filed a nearly-identical lawsuit in the Third Circuit claiming 
that the Mandate violated its religious freedom under RFRA and seeking 
injunctive relief.56  Conestoga, a Pennsylvania for-profit company with 950 
full-time employees, is owned and operated by the Hahn family.57  In 
addition to being the only voting shareholders, members of the Hahn family 
hold positions on the company’s board of directors.58 
The Hahns are practicing Mennonite Christians who operate their 
business “in accordance with their religious beliefs and moral principles.”59  
For example, in October 2012, the board of directors adopted “The Hahn 
Family Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life,” which provides that: 
[H]uman life begins at conception (at the point where an egg and 
sperm unite) and that it is a sacred gift from God and only God has 
the right to terminate human life. . . .  [I]t is against our moral 
conviction to be involved in the termination of human life through 
abortion . . . .60   
Indeed, the Mennonite Church “teaches that [the] taking of life which 
includes anything that terminates a fertilized embryo is an intrinsic evil and 
a sin against God to which they are held accountable.”61  Pursuant to these 
deeply held religious beliefs, Conestoga objects to two of the drugs that must 
 
 54. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 2012), rev’d 
723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 2751 (2014).   
 55. Id. 
 56. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 401–02 (E.D. Pa. 
2013), aff’d sub nom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Heatlh & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014).   
 57. Id. at 402. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 403 n.5.   
 61. Conestoga Wood Specialty Corp. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 381–82 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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be provided by group health insurance plans pursuant to the Mandate.62 
The Tenth Circuit granted Hobby Lobby’s motion for injunctive relief.63  
In contrast, the Third Circuit denied Conestoga’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction on similar claims.64  Creating a circuit split, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to address the application of RFRA to the for-profit 
corporations’ claims.65  The two cases were consolidated at the Supreme 
Court.66 
 The question presented before the Supreme Court was whether RFRA, 
which provides that the government “‘shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion’” unless that burden is the least restrictive 
means to further a compelling governmental interest,67 allows a for-profit 
corporation to deny its employees the health coverage for contraceptives—to 
which the employees are otherwise entitled under federal law—based on the 
religious objections of the corporation’s owners.68 
IV. CHALLENGING THE HHS MANDATE 
In passing the Affordable Care Act (Act), Congress established 
minimum coverage standards for various health insurance plans.69  
Applicable to Hobby Lobby, the minimum standards apply to employer-
provided group health plans covered by ERISA.70  One of the essential 
benefits that must be provided, without cost sharing, is preventive services 
 
 62. Id. at 382.  Specifically, the Hahns object to “emergency contraception” drugs Plan B (the 
“morning after pill”) and Ella (the “week after pill”).  Id. 
 63. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 64. Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 389. 
 65. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2014). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993)). 
 68. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 
(2013) (No. 13-354). 
 69. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2788 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
These essential benefits apply to non-grandfathered, employer-sponsored group health plans, as well 
as group and individual plans offered in the exchanges.  Id. at 2788 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
13).   
 70. See id. at 2762.  Employer-provided group insurance plans belong to the bundle of employee 
benefits governed by the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  See 29 
U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq.; see also 29 § U.S.C. 1185(d).  ERISA provides enforcement mechanisms that 
plan participants and beneficiaries can use to require employers to provide the benefits mandated 
under ERISA.  29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B); 1132(a)(3).  A qualified plan that complies with both the 
ACA and ERISA could be privately enforced under ERISA.  See id.   
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coverage, including screenings.71  Congress did not specify what type of 
services fall under this essential benefits provision.72  Instead, Congress 
deferred to the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), a 
division of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to 
develop comprehensive guidelines for determining what services must be 
provided under the preventive care and screenings provision of the Act.73 
Adopting the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine, HHS 
included in the mandatory essential benefits preventive services category 
“[a]ll [FDA] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and 
patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive 
capacity.”74  Dubbed the “Mandate,” this has become one of the most 
controversial requirements of the ACA.75 
Hobby Lobby is the first case to reach the Supreme Court, but it is only 
one of a long list of cases challenging the Mandate as violative of the 
claimants’ free exercise rights.76  To date, three hundred plaintiffs in twenty-
four states have filed over ninety-four cases challenging the constitutionality 
of the Mandate.77  Of these ninety-four cases, the number of lawsuits filed on 
 
 71. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2744 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)).   
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 2789 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012)).   
 75. See, e.g., Terri R. Day & Leticia M. Diaz, The Affordable Care Act and Religious Freedom: 
The Next Battleground, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 65 (2013); Eugene R. Milhizer, The Morality 
and Legality of the HHS Mandate and the “Accommodations”, 11 AVE MARIA L. REV. 211, 214 
(2013). 
 76. See, e.g., Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 2013) (private, for-profit auto-
lighting company); Korte v. Sebelius, 528 F. App’x 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012) (private, for-profit 
Catholic contractor business); Little Sisters of the Poor v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-2611-WJM-BNB, 
2013 WL 6839900 (D. Colo. Dec. 27, 2013) (non-profit Christian services provider for Roman 
Catholic Congregation of Sisters); Barron Indus, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13-CV-1330 (KBJ) (D.D.C. 
Sept. 25, 2013) (for-profit business); Mersino Dewatering v. Sebelius, No. 13-cv-01329-RLW 
(D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2013) (for-profit business); Criswell Coll. v. Sebelius, No. 12-CV-4409 (N.D. Tex. 
Apr. 9, 2013) (Baptist college); EWTN v. Sebelius, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (largest 
non-profit, Catholic television network founded by Mother Angelica, a cloistered nun); Colo. 
Christian Univ. v. Sebelius, No. 11-CV-03350-CMA-BNB, 2013 WL 93188 (D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2013) 
(non-profit, nondenominational Christian university); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-CV-
1096, 2012 WL 6845677, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 24, 2012) (for-profit business); Newland v. 
Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (private, for-profit Catholic HVAC manufacturer); 
Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012) (non-profit private Catholic 
school founded by Benedictine monks).  
 77. See BECKET FUND, HHS MANDATE INFORMATION CENTRAL, supra note 28.  “The Becket 
Fund for Religious Liberty has led the charge against the . . . HHS Mandate.”  THE BECKET FUND 
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behalf of for-profit entities is exactly half.78  Of the cases filed on behalf of 
the forty-seven for-profit entities, thirty-three of them have been decided in 
the plaintiff’s favor, with the court granting an injunction, while six of them 
have resulted in the government’s favor, with the court denying injunctive 
relief.79  Of the cases filed on behalf of the forty-seven nonprofit entities, 
twenty of them have been decided in the plaintiff’s favor, with the court 
granting an injunction, while eleven of them have resulted in the 
government’s favor, with the court denying injunctive relief.80  The 
remaining cases have either been dismissed on procedural grounds or are 
still pending.81 
Although not all of the ninety-four cases are mirror images, asserting the 
same claims and arguments, RFRA is the keystone on which these cases 
rely.  RFRA generally prohibits the federal government from “substantially 
burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability” unless the government demonstrates that the 
burden “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) 
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.”82  This “is an exacting standard, and the government bears the 
burden of satisfying it.”83  Invoking RFRA, the plaintiffs in nearly all of the 
nintety-four cases challenging the Mandate argue that it places a substantial 
burden on their sincerely held religious beliefs.84 
In addition to arguing that the Mandate violates RFRA, plaintiffs 
challenging its directives submit that it violates both the Religion and Free 
 
FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, TOP 5 THINGS YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE NEW HHS REGULATIONS, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhs-new-rule/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).   
 78. See BECKET FUND, HHS MANDATE INFORMATION CENTRAL, supra note 28. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2006) (codifying the strict scrutiny test established in 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)); Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 855 (2013) (“[T]he 
government has not . . . made an effort to satisfy strict scrutiny [at this point].  In particular, it has 
not demonstrated that requiring religious objectors to provide cost-free contraception coverage is the 
least restrictive means of increasing access to contraception.”); see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398 
(establishing strict scrutiny review as the test for evaluating claims asserted under the Free Exercise 
Clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 83. Grote, 708 F.3d at 854 (citing Korte v. Sebelius, 528 F. App’x 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 84. See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and in the 
Alternative for Summary Judgment at 1, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 
No. 1:13-cv-02611-WJM-BNB, 2013 WL 6195303 (D. Colo. Nov. 22 2013) (No. 13-1540).  
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Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.85  Specifically, because the 
government has exempted some churches and other religious objectors, 
including “integrated auxiliaries,”86 some litigants maintain that the Mandate 
discriminates against them by showing a preference toward certain church-
run organizations and not to others.87  In this way, they argue that the 
Mandate “inappropriately ‘interfer[es] with an internal . . . decision that 
affects the faith and mission’88 of a religious organization” and results in 
“explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious 
organizations.”89  Similarly, litigants challenging the Mandate argue that it 
violates the First Amendment because it imposes upon them an 
impermissible obligation to both “speak”90 in favor of a viewpoint that 
contradicts their beliefs and to be silent with respect to a viewpoint that is 
consistent with their beliefs.91 
A.   Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pre- and Post-  Employment 
Division v. Smith92 
One of the key issues in the Hobby Lobby case is whether a for-profit 
commercial business has standing under RFRA to bring a free exercise 
 
 85. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 47–55, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. 
Sebelius, 2013 WL 6839900 (No. 13-1540), available at http://www.becketfund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/LSP-CA10-Opening-Brief-AS-FILED-No-addendum.pdf.   
 86. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 
39,870, 39,871–74 (July 2, 2013).  This regulation exempts from the Mandate those religious 
employers that: “(1) Ha[ve] the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employ[] 
persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serve[] persons who share its religious tenets; 
and (4) [are] . . . nonprofit organization[s] described in section 6033(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of 
the Code.”  Id. at 39871.   
 87. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 50–51, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. 
Sebelius, 2013 WL 6839900 (No. 13-1540).   
 88. Id. at 49 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 707 (2012)). 
 89. Id. at 48–49 (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982) (“striking down laws 
that created differential treatment between ‘well-established churches’ and ‘churches which are new 
and lacking in a constituency’”)). 
 90. Id. at 52–56 (arguing that the Mandate’s requirement that employers provide group health 
insurance that covers contraceptives constitutes unconstitutional compelled speech). 
 91. Id. at 55–56 (arguing that the Mandate’s requirement that employers not instruct third-party 
benefit administrators to refrain from providing health coverage for contraceptives unconstitutionally 
silences them).   
 92. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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claim.93  First, however, is the foundational question regarding the scope of 
RFRA.  In 1993, reacting with disapproval to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Employment Division v. Smith, a free exercise case, Congress enacted 
RFRA.94 
In Smith, two workers were denied unemployment benefits after losing 
their jobs due to “religiously inspired peyote use.”95  The use of peyote, even 
for religious purposes, violated the general criminal drug laws of Oregon.96  
The Court considered whether the Free Exercise Clause required Oregon to 
pay unemployment benefits when workers lost their job for “religiously 
inspired peyote use,” an act illegal under the general criminal laws.97  
Despite previous precedents holding that claimants could not be denied 
benefits when they left their job for religious reasons,98 the Court ruled 
against the workers.99 
The Smith Court established the rule that a neutral law of general 
applicability that burdens the exercise of religion is not subject to strict 
scrutiny.100  After Smith, exceptions or accommodations from general laws 
not targeting religion were not automatically required absent compelling 
government interests.101  RFRA reinstated strict scrutiny standard of review, 
even when the government action that burdens “a person’s exercise of 
religion . . . results from a rule of general applicability.”102 
 
 93. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014). 
 94. H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 1 (1993) (“H.R. 1308, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993, responds to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith by creating a statutory right requiring that the compelling 
governmental interest test be applied in cases in which the free exercise of religion has been 
burdened by a law of general applicability.”). 
 95. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denying 
unemployment benefits to a Jehovah’s Witness who quit his job in a munitions factory for religious 
reasons violated the Free Exercise Clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denying 
unemployment benefits based on refusal to work on the Sabbath for religious reasons violated the 
Free Exercise Clause).  
 99. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 100. Id. at 888–89. 
 101. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008) (“Given the legitimacy 
of interests on both sides, we have avoided preset levels of scrutiny in favor of a sliding-scale 
balancing analysis: the scrutiny varies with the effect of the regulation at issue.”). 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.  When enacted, Congress relied on its power under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to make RFRA applicable to the states.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
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As applied to the Hobby Lobby case, the history of RFRA is important 
in defining its scope.  The Government’s argument was that RFRA reinstates 
pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence;103 and prior to RFRA, there had never 
been a case in which a for-profit commercial business brought a free 
exercise claim.104  In fact, the Government contended that a for-profit 
corporation is incapable of having religious beliefs that could be 
“impermissibly burdened under the First Amendment by general corporate 
regulation.”105 
Contrary to the Government’s position, Hobby Lobby contended that 
RFRA provides broad protection to any religious exercise and is not limited 
to “a right to religious exercise clearly established by a pre-Smith 
holding.”106  Despite its position that RFRA expanded the pre-Smith notion 
of free exercise rights, Hobby Lobby found precedent, predating Smith, 
supporting its claim that “religious exercise may legitimately occur in the 
sphere of for-profit business.”107 
Whatever the scope of RFRA, this issue bleeds into the standing 
question.  Whether pre-Smith cases define the scope of RFRA or whether 
RFRA expands free exercise jurisprudence to a broader post-Smith scope 
 
U.S. 507, 229 (1997).  In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that application of RFRA to the 
states exceeded Congress’ section 5 power, by redefining the substantive meaning of the Free 
Exercise Clause.  Id.  However, RFRA continues to be applicable to the federal government.  See 
Gonzales v. O’Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (under RFRA, 
the federal government lacked a compelling government interest to ban hoasca, a tea with 
hallucinogens, used by a religious group for sacramental rites).  
  Relying on its spending and commerce powers, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which applies to any government programs that receive 
federal funds and mirrors RFRA’s language applying strict scrutiny to government imposed land use 
regulations that substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-
5; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b); Korte v. Sebelius, 528 F. App’x 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2012).   
 103. Brief for Petitioners at 12–16, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) 
(No. 13-354). 
 104. Id. at 7 (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987)). 
 105. Id. at 17.  The Government points to legislative findings and RFRA’s purpose statement, 
which mentions pre-Smith cases and specifically states the purpose of the statute is “to restore the 
compelling interest test” set for in those pre-Smith case.  Id. at 15; see 42 § U.S.C. 2000bb(b)(1). 
 106. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 18–19. 
 107. Id. at 19 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (although holding against the 
Amish employer, the Court addressed a claim brought by a for-profit Amish business owner to be 
exempt from Social Security taxes based on religious grounds), and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 
599 (1961) (holding against the merchants, the Court addressed Jewish merchants’ challenge to the 
Sunday closing laws as a burden on their religious beliefs)).  
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will necessarily inform the answer to one of the central issues in this case. 
B.   Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
1. For-Profit Corporate Standing 
The standing issues in the Hobby Lobby case are two-fold.  First, the 
parties dispute whether the statutory term “person” in RFRA applies to a for-
profit commercial business, such as Hobby Lobby.108  Second, a disputed 
legal issue is whether the Greens, as the owners and trustees of Hobby 
Lobby, may bring a RFRA claim in their individual right, when the “injury” 
falls on the corporation.109  Although the pre- or post-Smith understanding of 
RFRA and its scope is the backdrop for the first standing issue, the 
following discussion will artificially set that aside for the moment. 
When isolated from the pre-/post-Smith consideration, the arguments on 
the statutory interpretation of “person” are fairly straightforward.  The 
relevant RFRA language, subject to differing interpretations, is “a person’s 
exercise of religion.”110  Hobby Lobby contended that “unless the context 
indicates otherwise,”111 the Dictionary Act provides RFRA’s definition of 
“person.”112  The Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” includes 
“corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and 
joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”113 
Not surprisingly, the Government disagreed.114  The Government’s 
argument hinged on the limiting language—“unless ‘the context indicates 
otherwise’”115—to the use of the Dictionary Act’s definition as a default.116  
According to the Government’s argument, RFRA’s term “person” is defined 
 
 108. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1126 (2013), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 109. Id. at 1135. 
 110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 111. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 16 (citing United States v. U.S. Mine Workers of 
Am., 330 U.S. 258, 275 (1947) (holding that when a statute does not specifically define a term, the 
Dictionary Act provides the definition of the term)). 
 112. Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, 
unless the context indicates otherwise,” the definition provided in the Act controls). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 21–22.   
 115. Id. at 22 (citing Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
 116. Id.   
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by the context in which the word is used; therefore, the Dictionary Act’s 
definition does not control.117  The term “person” must be read in the context 
of the term’s surrounding statutory language “a person’s exercise of 
religion,” which by definition and legal precedent excludes a for-profit 
corporation.118 
Leaving the analytic vacuum, which ignored the pre-/post-Smith 
consideration, defining the scope of RFRA based on Congress’ intent to 
reinstate pre-Smith jurisprudence or expand free exercise rights is relevant to 
the definitional question of person.  Far from being straightforward, one 
issue necessarily informs the other issue. 
Another layer of analysis relevant to the standing issue is whether there 
is a legal justification for treating for-profit and non-profit corporations 
differently.119  No one doubts that non-profit, religious corporate entities, 
such as churches and religious schools, enjoy free exercise rights and would 
have standing under RFRA.120  The Government, in particular, must find 
legal justification for limiting RFRA standing to individuals and non-profit 
religious organizations.121  Once again, justification can be found in the pre-
Smith free exercise jurisprudence,122 which circles back to “[t]he scope of 
RFRA” issue.123 
The Government found further support for limiting RFRA’s standing, 
excluding for-profit corporations, in other federal statutes.124  For instance, 
Title VII and the ADA have language that excludes “an employer that is ‘a 
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society’ from 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 18 (“The government offers no contrary analysis 
of RFRA’s text and context.  Instead, it asserts that RFRA protects only ‘individuals and religious 
non-profit institutions’ because no pre-Smith case held ‘that for-profit corporations have religious 
beliefs.’”).   
 120. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) 
(recognizing a long history of the “special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,” which 
comports with First Amendment principles). 
 121. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 14, 16. 
 122. See supra Part IV.A. 
 123. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 22.   
 124. Id. at 19–20.  Both Title VII and the ADA have statutory language that excludes religious 
entities from the application of the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of religion in those 
statutes.  See Hobby Lobby, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1130 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-1(a) and 12113(d)(1)–(2)). 
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‘the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of religion.’”125  The inference 
to be drawn from the lack of similar language in RFRA (on congressional 
intent and RFRA’s application to for-profit corporations) depends on 
familiar statutory construction arguments.126 
Because Congress enacted RFRA in the backdrop of Title VII and 
ADA, the Government argued that it intended the distinction between “non-
profit, religious organizations and for-profit, secular companies to apply in 
RFRA” and that Congress used the term “person” as a “shorthand” for 
“natural person or religious organization.”127  In contrast, Hobby Lobby 
argued that Congress’ failure to include limiting language similar to that in 
Title VII and ADA, coupled with its intent to broaden the scope of religious 
rights, means that the Dictionary Act’s broad definition of “person”128 
applies to RFRA.129  Accordingly, for-profit corporations, like Hobby 
Lobby, would have standing under RFRA. 
Alternatively, if Hobby Lobby lacks statutory standing in its corporate 
capacity, the Greens, as individuals, also brought claims under RFRA.130  
The Greens made the common sense argument that because they would have 
free exercise protections if they operated their business as a sole proprietor 
or partnership, they should not lose those protections simply because they 
chose to incorporate.131  Further, because the corporation is under the sole 
direction of the Green family, the choice to comply or not to comply with 
the Mandate is the Greens’.132  Accordingly, the Greens and the corporation 
“are indistinguishable for purposes of [their] case.”133  The usual 
“shareholder standing rule,” according to Respondents, has little application 
 
 125. Hobby Lobby, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d at 1130.   
 126. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 17–18. 
 127. Hobby Lobby, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 128. 1 U.S.C.A. § 1. 
 129. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 25–26. 
 130. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103.  
 131. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 31.  In their brief, Respondents cite M’Culloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 411 (1819) (“The power of creating a corporation is never used for its own 
sake, but for the purpose of effecting something else.”), for the “creative” proposition that the mere 
fact of incorporating should not defeat their individual religious claims.  McCulloch concerned the 
federal government’s authority to incorporate a national bank in the state of Maryland and 
established that congressional powers extended to activities that were “Necessary and Proper” to 
exercise its enumerated powers.  Id. at 30. 
 132. Id. at 30–31.   
 133. Id. at 32.   
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to the Greens and Hobby Lobby, because they are one and the same.134 
The Government, however, relied upon the “longstanding shareholder 
standing rule,” which recognizes a legal distinction between shareholders 
and a corporation, even a closely held corporation.135  Under this rule, 
shareholders lack standing to bring claims “‘intended to redress injuries to a 
corporation.’”136  According to the Government’s argument, the Greens face 
no personal liability and have no personal responsibility for administering 
the group health plan.137  To the contrary, the Government maintained that 
Hobby Lobby’s “conflation problem” (the assertion that Greens and the 
corporate entity are indistinguishable) creates another problem.138  As 
managers, the Greens may also be fiduciaries of the ERISA plan sponsored 
by the corporation.139  Fiduciaries owe duties to the participants and 
beneficiaries of the plan and must follow its terms as required by ERISA—
not according to their own personal religious views.140  Finally, the remedy 
the Greens sought, injunctive relief, exempts the corporation “from the 
contraceptive-coverage provision [and] does not follow from the injury [the 
Greens] allege[d].”141  
The standing issue is, of course, the key to the rest of the RFRA 
claim.142  If Hobby Lobby has standing to bring a RFRA claim, then it must 
show that the Mandate substantially burdens its exercise of religion.143  Next, 
the burden shifts to the Government to demonstrate that the Mandate serves 
a compelling government interest and that there is no less restrictive way to 
meet that interest.144 
Because this Article is intended as a primer, not a legal treatise, the 
elements of a RFRA claim are discussed independently and sequentially.  In 
reality, they often blend together.145  Like the standing issue, the substantial 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 28. 
 136. Id. (quoting Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 622 (6th Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom. 
Autocam Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014)).   
 137. Id. at 29. 
 138. Id.   
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)).   
 141. Id. at 26–27. 
 142. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c).   
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)–(2). 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).   
 145. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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burden inquiry requires an analysis of who bears the liability and 
responsibility for compliance and who suffers if the Court requires an 
exemption or accommodation for Hobby Lobby and other similarly situated 
for-profit corporations.146 
2. Substantial Burden 
The parties’ sincerely held religious beliefs were not at issue in the 
case.147  Although the sincerity and centrality issues are distinct, neither was 
in dispute in this case.148  Under RFRA, courts do not evaluate the centrality 
of a religious tenet to a plaintiff’s “system of religious belief.”149  Consistent 
with free exercise jurisprudence, courts accept the line-drawing plaintiffs 
make in defining the contours of their own religious beliefs.150  There is no 
dispute on this longstanding principle.151  However, the parties differed 
dramatically on the factors that should be considered in determining whether 
or not the Mandate burdens Hobby Lobby’s free exercise of religion. 
Hobby Lobby argued to apply the simplicity of the Yoder152 standard 
“where a mandate and penalty were the quintessential substantial burden 
even when the fine was a mere $5.”153  Defining the burden in terms of the 
monetary cost of compliance drew a lot of questions from the Court during 
oral argument.154  For instance, Hobby Lobby’s counsel estimated the cost of 
compliance based on the number of employees and the amount of the fine at 
$475 million a year.155  Justices Kagan and Sotomayor challenged Hobby 
Lobby’s counsel on this issue.156  They suggested that Hobby Lobby could 
 
 146. See infra Part IV.B.2.   
 147. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014).  See supra Part III for a 
discussion regarding Hobby Lobby’s and Conestoga’s religious beliefs about life beginning “[at] 
moment of conception” and why they object to certain contraceptives required under the Mandate. 
 148. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 12.   
 149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-5(7)(A), 2000bb-2(4). 
 150. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). 
 151. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 32.   
 152. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (involving Amish parents who refused to comply 
with Wisconsin’s compulsory education law for children up to the age of 16 and who faced a $5.00 
penalty as a result).  
 153. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 39–40.   
 154. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21.   
 155. Id. at 22.   
 156. Id. at 22–23.   
[Vol. 42: 55, 2014] A Primer on Hobby Lobby 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
77 
provide no health insurance at all and pay the $2,000 per employee tax, 
resulting in $26 million in taxes per year.157  Justice Kagan posited that this 
tax would be less than the cost of providing health insurance for the 
employees.158  Considering this choice, Justice Kagan asked, “[W]hy is there 
a substantial burden at all?”159 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia aided Hobby Lobby’s counsel 
in this colloquy.  Chief Justice Roberts refocused the burden from the cost of 
noncompliance to the religious commitment of the owners to provide health 
insurance to their employees.160  Justice Scalia rebuked the idea that Hobby 
Lobby’s burden would be negligible if it chose to pay the tax instead of 
providing insurance.161  There was even some levity during oral argument.  
After Hobby Lobby’s counsel referred to the $2,000 per employee payment 
as a penalty, Justice Sotomayor corrected him that it is a tax, not a penalty, 
to which Chief Justice Roberts quipped: “She’s right about that.”162 
Moving from the simplicity of a mandate and a penalty, the 
Government’s substantial burden standard requires more factors to be 
considered, such as attenuation and third parties.163  The Government 
characterized Hobby Lobby’s substantial burden claim as similar to a 
taxpayer claim.164  Like a taxpayer, Hobby Lobby’s payment for health 
insurance goes “into an undifferentiated fund to finance covered benefits.”165  
Hobby Lobby’s financial contribution is too attenuated from the decisions 
made by employees and their healthcare providers to use contraceptives or 
any other treatment.166  Consequently, where the connection between the 
claimed injury and the government action is too attenuated, and the actual 
use of the objectionable contraceptives is dependent on third party decisions, 
there is no substantial burden.167  Finally, in the substantial burden analysis, 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 22.   
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 23. 
 161. Id. at 25–26. 
 162. Id. at 23–24. 
 163. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 33.   
 164. Id. at 34.     
 165. Id. at 33.   
 166. Id. at 33–34. 
 167. Id. at 32–34 (citing to RFRA’s legislative history, Senate Report 12, which expressly states 
that the statute was not intended to “change the law” in Tilton v Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 
(1971) (denying taxpayer’s free exercise claim based on federal grants given to religiously-affiliated 
[Vol. 42: 55, 2014] A Primer on Hobby Lobby 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
78 
the Government would consider the injury to Hobby Lobby employees, who 
do not necessarily share their employer’s religious beliefs and who would be 
denied a government benefit.168 
Criticizing the Government’s substantial burden standard as “newfound 
principles” and a “masterpiece of obfuscation,” Hobby Lobby identified the 
relevant inquiry as the “intensity of the coercion applied by the government 
to act contrary to those beliefs,” rather than attenuation or third party 
decision-making.169   The effect on third parties, according to Hobby Lobby, 
is irrelevant to the substantial burden analysis; it is part of the strict scrutiny 
analysis.170  Additionally, Hobby Lobby asserted that HHS’s exemption to 
certain non-profit entities and accommodation to others is proof that the 
Mandate is a substantial burden and one that the Government recognizes.171 
As with the other elements of the RFRA claim, the substantial burden 
and strict scrutiny analyses overlap.  The issues of exemptions or 
accommodations and burdens on third parties are considered in the 
compelling interests172 and least-restrictive-means173 discussions. 
3. Strict Scrutiny 
 a. Compelling Interests: Public Health,  Gender Equality, Uniform 
 Regulatory Scheme 
Concerns about the interests of third parties, specifically Hobby Lobby’s 
 
colleges and universities because there was no coercion “directed at the practice or exercise of their 
religious beliefs”)); see also Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 
(1968) (finding indirect financial support does not constitute coercion of plaintiffs “as individuals in 
the practice of their religion”). 
 168. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 33.  
 169. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 41 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 170. Id. at 43–44.   
The effect on others of allowing the religious objectors to opt out of a program is 
properly considered in evaluating whether the government has carried its burden under 
strict scrutiny, but it does not affect whether there is a substantial burden.  Thus, folding 
concerns about “affected third parties” into the substantial burden inquiry is a category 
mistake that improperly shifts the government’s burden to the believer. 
Id. (citations omitted).     
 171. Id. at 39. 
 172. See infra Part IV.B.3.a. 
 173. See infra Part IV.B.3.b. 
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employees, loom large throughout the strict scrutiny analysis.174  Relief to 
Hobby Lobby, through an accommodation,175 deprives Hobby Lobby 
employees of a government-mandated benefit and imposes religious beliefs 
on them that may be contrary to their own.176  In making accommodations, 
the First Amendment requires a consideration of the rights of third parties 
who may be burdened by an accommodation177 and an obligation to be 
“religion-neutral” in granting accommodations.178  While the Government 
interjected the notion of third party rights in considering the substantial 
burden on Hobby Lobby,179 it is certainly a factor in the strict scrutiny 
analysis. 
It is the Government’s burden to establish that the Mandate serves a 
compelling government interest and the Mandate is the least restrictive 
means to achieve its interest.180  The Government asserted three interests: (1) 
protecting the rights of employees entitled to the benefits of a 
comprehensive employer-sponsored health insurance plan; (2) promoting 
public health; and (3) providing equal access for women to healthcare 
 
 174. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 44–56. 
 175. The relief sought by Hobby Lobby could come in the form of an exemption or 
accommodation.  See 45 C.F.R. § 147.131.  HHS had already created an exemption from the 
contraceptive for small religious employers, which primarily promote religious doctrine, hire and 
serve people of a similar faith, and are tax exempt nonprofit organizations.  45 C.F.R. § 
147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A) (2011) (current version at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b) (2014)).  See generally, Day 
& Diaz, supra note 75, at 96 (discussing the Mandate and exemptions carved out for religious, 
nonprofit entities such as churches).  Subsequent to the exemption that was carved out for small, 
religious, nonprofit entities, HHS has accommodated other nonprofit, religious entities such as 
hospitals and universities.  See id.  The authors take the position that if Hobby Lobby is entitled to 
any relief under RFRA, an accommodation is the appropriate relief, not an exemption.  Id.   
 176. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 39 n.9.   
 177. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (finding that an employee refusing to work 
on the Sabbath for religious reasons could not be denied unemployment benefits but employer’s 
obligation to accommodate the employee’s religious exercise was limited by the employer’s 
obligation not to burden other employees’ rights). 
 178. The Establishment Clause forbids the government from favoring one religion over another or 
a “believer” over a non-believer.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) 
(“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state 
nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid 
all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”); see also Day & Diaz, supra note 75, at 93–95. 
 179. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 14 (“Those decisions by independent third parties 
are not attributable to the employer that finances the plan or to the individuals who own the 
company, and the connection is too indirect as a matter of law to impose a substantial burden.”). 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). 
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services.181 
As to the first asserted interest, Hobby Lobby argued that providing “a 
comprehensive insurance system” is “newly-identified,” because this interest 
was not discussed in the lower courts.182  However, raising novel points—
even inconsistent positions—is nothing new to litigation involving the 
ACA.183  Newly-identified or not, recognizing the protection of employee 
benefits under a comprehensive insurance system as a compelling 
government interest makes this case more analogous to United States v. 
Lee.184  In Lee, the Court required Amish employers and employees to pay 
Social Security taxes, despite their religious beliefs and no future claim to 
such benefits.185  Further, the Court viewed an accommodation as a threat to 
the comprehensive nature of the system, causing harm to third parties who 
would rely on the Social Security system.186 
In fact, the narrowly crafted, religion-based exemption Congress 
provided to self-employed individuals did not change the Court’s holding or 
analysis.187  Therefore, based on the rationale of Lee, the exemption and 
accommodations already made to religious, non-profit entities do not 
undermine the Government’s contention that the Mandate serves a 
compelling interest in ensuring employees’ benefits under a comprehensive 
insurance plan.188 
On this asserted interest, Hobby Lobby argued that it cannot be 
 
 181. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 38–52. 
 182. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 44. 
 183. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (determining 
that the individual mandate is a penalty for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act and a tax for 
purposes of congressional authority to enact ACA under its Taxing and Spending power where the 
government argued inconsistent theories concerning the power of Congress to pass the ACA and 
whether the must carry provision—a.k.a. the “individual mandate”—is a tax or penalty).  
 184. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 185. Id. at 260–61 (recognizing a narrow exemption for self-employed Amish under 26 U.S.C. § 
1402(g) but not those who willingly enter commercial activity because “every person cannot be 
shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious 
beliefs”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 261 (“Granting an exemption from social security taxes to an employer operates to 
impose the employer’s religious faith on the employees.”).  
 188. Granting an exemption to the contraception mandate of the ACA would not only infringe 
upon the rights of employees by imposing religious faith, but would also diminish the benefits that 
would be otherwise gained from the contraceptive portion of a health insurance plan.  See supra 
notes 155, 168 and accompanying text; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 103, at 38. 
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compelling based on the grandfathering provision provided for in the ACA, 
which exempts millions of employees covered by grandfathered plans.189  
The grandfather provision allows for a transition or phase-in period for the 
Mandate and other provisions of the Act.190  The Government maintains that 
a phase-in period for a comprehensive, uniform federal statute does not 
diminish the compelling interest served by the statute.191 
At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts tried to “pin down” the 
Government on how long the grandfathering period would last.192  Unable to 
answer with a precise time period, Chief Justice Roberts opined that the 
Court’s analysis should recognize that the afforded exemptions under the 
grandfathered plans are current and are not going to end.193  An interest that 
“‘leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited’” 
is not one of the “‘highest order’” and does not satisfy strict scrutiny.194 
In reviewing a government regulation subject to strict scrutiny review, 
courts have required that the interests asserted by the government “are real, 
not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these 
harms in a direct and material way.”195  Courts do not defer to legislative 
judgments on these points.196  Rather, the government must provide 
sufficient evidence to establish that the harms exist and that the challenged 
regulation will, in fact, remedy those harms.197  The parties disputed both 
these points. 
The Government’s asserted interests of public health and gender 
 
 189. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2013); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 18011 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 147.140(g). 
 190. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d at 1124; see also 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a)(2) 
(2012).  United States Code Section 18011(e) defines “grandfathered health plan” as “any group 
health plan or health insurance coverage” which an individual was enrolled in on March 23, 2010 
and is not subject to this subtitle.  This section allows for the preservation of existing coverage.  42 
U.S.C. § 18011(a)(2) (2012). 
 191. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 54.   
 192. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 59.  
 193. Id. 
 194. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) 
(quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541–43 (1989)).  
 195. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S 622, 664 (1994). 
 196. Id. at 666 (“On the contrary, we have stressed in First Amendment cases that the deference 
afforded to legislative findings does ‘not foreclose our independent judgment of the facts bearing on 
an issue of constitutional law.’”). 
 197. Id. at 664.   
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equality in healthcare are supported by experts and authoritative reports.198  
In promulgating the Mandate, HHS relied on a report by the Institute of 
Medicine that documents the health risks to women due to unintended 
pregnancies.199  Further, the Government relied on the legislative history of 
the ACA200 and reports from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
for the proposition that “women of child-bearing age spend [substantially 
more] in out-of-pocket health care costs than men.”201 
Hobby Lobby argued that the Government’s asserted interests are much 
too abstract as applied to its objections to the Mandate.  Hobby Lobby only 
objects to four of the twenty required drugs—the drugs that prevent the 
implantation of a fertilized egg.202  Furthermore, Hobby Lobby contends that 
the existing “bevy of exemptions” to the Mandate undercut the 
Government’s contention that the interests asserted are compelling.203  
Hobby Lobby focused on the Government’s obligation to “prove” the 
existence of the harm.204  Hobby Lobby made a rather literal and far-fetched 
argument that the only potential “harm” to Hobby Lobby employees is the 
loss of free insurance coverage for four of the twenty mandated FDA-
approved drugs required under the Mandate.205  Defining the harm so 
narrowly, Hobby Lobby then argued that the Government could not show 
that the interests asserted would be affected at all by denying its employees 
these four drugs.206 
Relying on the Court’s recent decision striking down California’s 
 
 198. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellees at 34, Contestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 
F. Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 13-1144).   
 199. See Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 17–18, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
678 (2013) (No. 13-354); see also 26 C.F.R. § 54 (2012) (“As documented in a report of the Institute 
of Medicine, ‘Clinical Preventive Services for Women, Closing the Gaps,’ women experiencing an 
unintended pregnancy may not immediately be aware that they are pregnant, and thus delay prenatal 
care.  They also may not be as motivated to discontinue behaviors that pose pregnancy-related risks 
(e.g., smoking, consumption of alcohol).  Studies show a greater risk of preterm birth and low birth 
weight among unintended pregnancies compared with pregnancies that were planned.”).  
 200. See Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 199, at 17–18.    
 201. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 202. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 4–5.   
 203. Id. at 5, 50.   
 204. Id. at 45 (“[T]he government ‘must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely 
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.’  
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).”) 
 205. See id. at 30–31, 47–48.   
 206. Id. at 45–51.   
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restrictions on violent video games, Hobby Lobby applied that Court’s 
demand for actual proof of harm to the Government’s burden in this case.207  
However, in the violent video game case, the Court did not demand the level 
of exacting proof that Hobby Lobby claimed.208  The Brown Court did not 
require the State of California to prove that specific video games denied to 
specific children would reduce violence in that targeted group.209  Therefore, 
reliance on Brown for the proposition that the Government must prove that 
“exclusion of these four contraceptives threatens public health or gender 
equality”210 to satisfy strict scrutiny is ill-placed. 
Another problem with defining the harm posed by Hobby Lobby’s 
objection to the Mandate so narrowly is that it creates a slippery slope.  As 
will be discussed below, if each claimant’s objection is individually 
considered from the narrow perspective of which medical drugs or services 
are objected to and which third parties are burdened, the ACA’s goal to 
expand comprehensive health care insurance to vast numbers of uninsured 
Americans will be eviscerated.211  This point goes to the heart of the 
controversy generally and to the strict scrutiny analysis specifically.  Before 
turning to the “big picture,” the Government’s burden to satisfy the least 
restrictive means test will be discussed.212 
 b. Least Restrictive Means Test 
The Government’s burden of meeting the least restrictive means test 
required under RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard raises the issue of 
accommodation once more.213  The accommodation HHS already made for 
religious, nonprofit entities, such as hospitals and universities, suggests the 
same could be done for Hobby Lobby.214  At the very least, the existence of 
 
 207. Id. at 48 (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011) (questioning 
the Government’s proof of a compelling interest—harm to children caused by playing violent video 
games which would be alleviated by restricting sales to children under eighteen—the Court placed 
the “risk of uncertainty” on the Government and concluded that “ambiguous proof will not 
suffice”)). 
 208. Cf. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738–39.   
 209. Id.   
 210. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 48. 
 211. See infra Part VI.  
 212. See infra Part IV.B.3.b. 
 213. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2801 (2014). 
 214. Qualifying organizations self-certify by claiming eligibility and providing a copy of the self-
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an accommodation already granted casts a shadow of doubt on the 
Government’s argument that there are no less restrictive ways for the 
government to ensure Hobby Lobby employees receive the full benefits of 
the Mandate.215 
The Government contended that Hobby Lobby’s least restrictive 
alternative is no alternative at all, as it requires Congress to create a program 
or expand an already existing federal program.216  However, the Institute of 
Medicine and the other experts that HHS relied upon in adopting the 
Mandate suggested that providing coverage for contraceptive services would 
provide cost-savings because contraceptives are less expensive than the costs 
associated with unwanted pregnancies.217  Even if costs are marginal, the 
question of who should bear those costs remains.  Hobby Lobby posed the 
question as follows: “[T]he ultimate question here is not whether there will 
be an exception to an otherwise uniform mandate, but who will pay for a 
third-party’s religiously-sensitive abortifacients.”218 
In contrast, the Government relied on the rationale of Lee.219  
Analogizing the ACA and its mandates to Social Security, the Government 
found authority in Lee for the proposition that directly financing Hobby 
Lobby employees’ contraceptives is not an accommodation required under 
RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard.220  Because the Court did not require the 
Government to subsidize Lee’s employees as a less restrictive alternative to 
requiring him to pay Social Security taxes, government subsidization of 
Hobby Lobby employees’ contraceptive needs is not a less restrictive 
alternative.221 
The existence of already established exemptions and accommodations to 
the Mandate has been both a shield and a sword for Hobby Lobby’s case.  In 
 
certification to the issuer or a third-party administrator.  See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39879–80 (July 2, 2013) (outlining accommodation for 
self-insured religious non-profits). 
 215. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 57–58. 
 216. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 57–58.   
 217. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 199, at 15–16.   
 218. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 59.   
 219. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1981); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 57–58.  
 220. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 52–53, 57–58.   
 221. Id. at 58 (“On [Respondents’] theory, the government itself should have financed Social 
Security benefits directly to Lee's employees, as a less restrictive alternative to requiring that Lee 
pay Social Security taxes.  The Court did not find such a government-funded scheme to be a less 
restrictive alternative in Lee, and it should not do so here.”). 
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fact, the existing exemptions and accommodations bolster Hobby Lobby’s 
burden of proof on the standing and substantial burden elements and weaken 
the Government’s burden of proof on the prongs of strict scrutiny. 
Hobby Lobby’s brief begins with the following statement: “On the 
merits, this is one of the most straight-forward violations of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act this Court is likely to see.”222  Although it may be a 
good opening line for its “shock value,” for legal minds, it is a non sequitur.  
For the millions of people who will be affected by the Supreme Court’s 
decision, however, the Hobby Lobby case might be cast in simple “either-
ors”: individual liberty versus social responsibility; religious rights versus 
women’s reproductive rights; business versus government regulation; and 
private health care versus government mandated health care.223 
Before turning the discussion from the legal issues as specifically raised 
in Hobby Lobby to a big picture discussion of their potential ramifications, 
there is a not-so-insignificant constitutional concern regarding the Mandate 
that looms in the shadow of the RFRA question.  Justice Kennedy raised this 
issue in oral argument: “[W]hat kind of constitutional structure do we have 
if the Congress can give an agency the power to grant or not grant a religious 
exemption based on what the agency determined?”224  Justice Kennedy was, 
 
 222. Brief for Respondents, supra note 42, at 59.   
 223. In keeping with the “primer” theme, the following questions might be similar to those posed 
by a hypothetical “man-on-the-street.”  
  Standing: Should the non-profit/for-profit distinction make a difference?  If an individual has 
free exercise rights, should his choice to incorporate change those rights?  Should religion be infused 
into secular for-profit business and excuse obligations to comply with general business regulations?  
Do corporations exercise religious beliefs?  Whose religious beliefs are ascribed to the corporation—
the officers’, the shareholders’, the employees’?  
  Substantial Burden: Whose burden counts—the employer’s or the employee’s?  Do the rights 
and obligations of third parties count?  If a third party administers the health-benefit plan, and 
decisions to use contraceptives are made by third parties, what direct burden does that place on the 
employer?  How is an employer harmed by a third party’s use of contraceptives paid for by an 
employer-sponsored benefit plan to which an employer contributed undifferentiated funds? 
  Compelling Interest: Does exempting some insurance plans make the government’s interests 
less compelling?  Should an employer’s personal religious beliefs excuse compliance with a 
national, comprehensive benefits program that promotes public health and equalizes health care 
access and costs for women?  
  Less Restrictive Means: Does the government have to directly subsidize benefits that 
employers object to on religious grounds?  Do the ACA and its mandates create a national, 
comprehensive benefits program for which, as with Social Security, no accommodations are required 
for general taxpayers, including for-profit corporations? 
 224. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 56. 
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of course, referring to the nondelegation doctrine, which forces “a politically 
accountable Congress to make . . . policy choices, rather than leave [these 
choices] to unelected administrative officials.”225 
V. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE:  CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON AGENCY 
DECISION-MAKING 
Although it has been over eighty years since the Court has invalidated a 
federal law based on impermissible delegation of legislative power,226 the 
nondelegation doctrine is not dead.227  While this doctrine has not served as 
the basis for striking down any federal legislation since 1935,228 in more 
recent times, two Justices have rekindled the nondelegation doctrine—at 
least in principle.229  “When fundamental policy decisions underlying 
important legislation about to be enacted are to be made, the buck stops with 
Congress . . . .”230 
The massive network of administrative agencies, which exercises vast 
quasi-legislative powers, has spawned the familiar term: the “headless fourth 
branch of government.”231  Although the Constitution does not expressly 
address administrative agencies or their authority, the immense amount of 
federal regulation necessitates the creation of federal agencies with broad 
 
 225. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 328 (3d ed. 2006).   
 226. See id. (discussing Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) and A.L.A. Schecter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 557 (1935), cases in which the Court found legislation 
to be unconstitutional based, in part, on impermissible delegation of legislative authority).  
 227. See CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 440 
(4th ed. 2013) (“Whatever its benefits, the nondelegation doctrine is on the constitutional critical 
list.”). 
 228. See, e.g., Panama Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 414–19 (finding the National Industrial Recovery Act 
unconstitutional based on an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the executive branch 
without sufficiently articulated standards); Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 541–42 (finding a 
regulation promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional as both 
exceeding Congress’ commerce powers and as an impermissible delegation of legislative authority).  
However, neither case has been overruled. 
 229. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding 
Congress’ creation of the United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines 
for federal crimes was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judicial branch); see 
also Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring) (concluding that provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act authorizing the 
Secretary of Labor to adopt safety standards was an excessive delegation of legislative power). 
 230. Indus. Union Dep’t, 488 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).   
 231. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013). 
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rule-making powers.232  Congress lacks the expertise and time to enact the 
plethora of regulatory rules governing every aspect of Americans’ lives; 
therefore, broad delegation is both efficient and necessary.233  However, 
agency promulgated rules have the force of law.234  Further, many 
administrative agencies are empowered not only with legislative authority, 
but also with enforcement and adjudicatory powers.235  Such an accretion of 
multiple powers in non-elected administrative agencies threatens the 
principles of separation of powers and insulates Congress from political 
accountability.236 
For nearly eight decades, the impermissible delegation argument has 
been lost to “intelligible principle[s].”237  To avoid an excessive delegation 
challenge, Congress must state “an intelligible principle to which the person 
or body authorized to [take action] is directed to conform.”238  In deciding 
that Congress’ creation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission to promulgate 
sentencing guidelines did not violate the nondelegation doctrine, the Court 
discussed what type of directives Congress must provide to avoid 
impermissible delegation to a nonlegislative body.239 
The Court identified three factors that Congress must clearly delineate 
for its delegation of legislative authority to pass constitutional muster: “[(1)] 
the general policy, [(2)] the public agency which is to apply it, and [(3)] the 
boundaries of this delegated authority.”240  Although the Mistretta Court 
identified three goals, four purposes, and eighteen factors that Congress 
 
 232. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406–07 (1928) (“The field of 
Congress involves all and many varieties of legislative action, and Congress has found it frequently 
necessary to use officers of the executive branch within defined limits, to secure the exact effect 
intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in such officers to make public regulations 
interpreting a statute and directing the details of its execution, even to the extent of providing for 
penalizing a breach of such regulations.”).   
 233. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1695–97 (1975) (defending broad delegation powers due to complexity of 
regulation and the politicization of the legislative process).  
 234. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death 
Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1303 n.15 (2003). 
 235. See J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 406.   
 236. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332, 374–75 
(2002). 
 237. See J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 409.   
 238. Id. 
 239. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–79 (1989). 
 240. Id. at 372–73 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). 
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defined for the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the minimal threshold to 
satisfy the amount and sufficiency of detail remains unclear.241  “‘Only if . . . 
there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator’s 
action, so that it would be impossible . . . to ascertain whether the will of 
Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of 
means for effecting its declared purpose.”242 
Proponents of Hobby Lobby’s claim have argued that the Mandate 
violates the nondelegation doctrine.243  In support of their argument, the 
proponents point to the fact that the ACA “provides no intelligible principle 
in 42 U.S.C. §300gg-13(a)(4) to guide the Administration’s expansion from 
‘preventive care and screening’ to contraceptives and abortifacients.”244  In 
essence, Congress identified a broad policy to provide “preventive care and 
screenings” for women without cost-sharing and identified HHS and its 
Human Resources and Services Administration to promulgate guidelines for 
implementation of that policy.245  However, Congress did not provide 
specific, defined factors that would have guided HRSA to recommend, and 
HHS to adopt, a requirement that qualified insurance plans must cover all 
FDA-approved contraceptive methods at no cost to female beneficiaries.246 
Justice Kennedy raised another impermissible delegation concern in oral 
argument.247  He questioned the constitutional basis on which Congress 
could delegate to HHS “the power to grant or not grant a religious 
exemption.”248  Justice Kennedy articulated his concern as follows:  
I recognize delegation of powers rules are somewhat more abundant 
insofar as their enforcement in this Court.  But when we have a First 
Amendment issue of—of this consequence, shouldn’t we indicate 
 
 241. See id. at 374–75, 379. 
 242. Id. at 379 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1944)). 
 243. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Eagle Forum Educ. & Legal Defense Fund, Inc., in Support 
of the Conestoga Wood Specialties et al. Petitioners and the Hobby Lobby et al. Respondents at 20–
21, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 13-354), and Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 13-356) [hereinafter Brief Amicus Curiae].   
 244. Id. at 20.   
 245. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4); Michael Barone, Jr., Delegation and the Destruction of 
American Liberties: The Affordable Care Act and the Contraception Mandate, 29 TOURO L. REV. 
795, 825, 827–28 (2013). 
 246. Barone, Jr., supra note 245, at 827–28. 
 247. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 56. 
 248. Id. at 56.   
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that it’s for the Congress, not the agency to determine . . . 
exemption[s] . . . and not even for RFRA purposes, for other 
purposes.249 
Closely related to the nondelegation doctrine is the issue of judicial 
deference to agency decision-making.  Although not presently before the 
Supreme Court, Hobby Lobby and many other plaintiffs in the cases 
circulating through the federal courts have raised claims under the APA.250  
It is almost certain that if the Court rules against Hobby Lobby on the RFRA 
claim, the APA claim will be the next litigated issue.251 
Normally, courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it 
administers.252  The reason for administrative deference is similar to the 
rationale underlying the nondelegation doctrine and the intelligible principle.  
If Congress’ delegation is clear and supported by standards for the agency to 
follow, the Court will give deference to the decisions of the agency tasked 
with implementing Congress’ policy choices.253  Therefore, under the APA, 
courts will not set aside an administrative action unless it is “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the 
law.”254 
Indeed, Hobby Lobby and other plaintiffs will argue that the Mandate is 
“an abuse of discretion [and] not in accordance with law.”255  If RFRA does 
not require the Government to accommodate or exempt Hobby Lobby, 
Hobby Lobby and other nonexempt objectors will argue that the Mandate is 
unconstitutional, not just as applied to Hobby Lobby and other religious 
objectors, but on its face.256  It follows that if the Mandate is based on an 
 
 249. Id. at 56–57. 
 250. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2013); FCC 
v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009); see also John Lyle, Contraception and 
Corporate Personhood: Does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment Protect For-Profit 
Corporations That Oppose the Employer Mandate?, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 137, 144–46 (2013). 
 251. Cf. Lyle, supra note 250, at 165 (applying the “appropriate analyses to the Employer 
Mandate to show that although the ACA likely holds up under the Smith standard established for the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, it likely will not withstand the heightened scrutiny of 
RFRA”). 
 252. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 253. Id. 
 254. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 255. Id. 
 256. Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 243, at 34 (“[T]he Contraceptive Mandate is ultra vires as 
applied to any employer (i.e., not merely to religious employers).”).   
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“ultra vires” delegation of legislative power, the Mandate is 
unconstitutional.257  Therefore, under the APA, the administrative deference 
standard will not apply.  Perhaps this is what Justice Kennedy had in mind 
when he questioned the appropriateness of an agency, rather than Congress, 
deciding religious exemptions, not just under RFRA, but also “for other 
purposes.”258 
In a recent challenge to the rule-making authority of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), the Court separated the issue of 
whether a rule violated the APA from the constitutional issue.259  When the 
FCC’s regulation of broadcast indecency changed dramatically, the Court 
applied the APA’s deferential standard finding the change of policy was not 
arbitrary and capricious.260  However, the case came back to the Supreme 
Court a second time on the constitutional issue.261 
Unlike the FCC’s indecency policy, the Mandate does not involve a 
change of policy, but the creation of one;262 however, the Fox case may 
nevertheless be instructive.263  Despite the APA, when constitutional issues 
are at stake, courts will not apply the deferential standard to administrative 
rulemaking.264  Like the nondelegation doctrine, the deferential agency 
standard allows Congress to escape voter dissatisfaction in implementing 
controversial policies and offends the principle of separation of powers.265  
First, Congress delegates to HHS the task of defining what services satisfy 
 
 257. Id.  
 258. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 56. 
 259. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 516 (2009) (finding the FCC’s changed 
indecency policy was not arbitrary and capricious, but declining to address whether it violated the 
First Amendment).  See generally Day & Weatherby, supra note 12.   
 260. Fox, 556 U.S. at 517 (finding that the change in policy that previously excluded fleeting 
expletives from the FCC indecency policy to one that levied substantial fines for an isolated 
expletive was not arbitrary and capricious under the APA). 
 261. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2311 (2012). 
 262. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 507 (2009).   
 263. But cf. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 (2014) (“HHS contends 
that RFRA does not permit us to take this option into account because RFRA cannot be used to 
require creation of entirely new programs . . . [b]ut we see nothing in RFRA that supports this 
argument, and drawing the line between the creation of an entirely new program and the 
modification of an existing program (which RFRA surely allows) would be fraught with problems.” 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 264. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 513–16.  
 265. Cf. id. at 536 (“If agencies were permitted unbridled discretion, their actions might violate 
important constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and balances.”). 
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“preventive care and screening;”266 then, under the APA, courts must give 
deference to the Mandate.267 
Thus, in addition to the statutory RFRA claim, the Mandate presents 
constitutional structural concerns regarding the nondelegation doctrine and 
the APA’s agency deference standard.  Regardless of a win or loss on the 
RFRA claim, these two issues will continue to be litigated in the federal 
courts.  Whether or not the Supreme Court will hear Hobby Lobby for a 
second time or other plaintiffs’ cases make their way to the Supreme Court, 
RFRA is just the first battle in these newly framed religious freedom cases. 
VI. SLIPPERY SLOPE – ELANE PHOTOGRAPHY, LLC V.  WILLOCK 
Whatever the resolutions are to the above-posed questions, there will be 
practical ramifications from the Hobby Lobby decision.  The most obvious 
one is how far-reaching the Court’s decision will be and what impact it will 
have on the future of our free exercise jurisprudence.  This Court’s decision 
will undoubtedly affect the trajectory of the law governing exemptions from 
public accommodation laws for secular employers with deeply held religious 
beliefs, potentially resulting in a new wave of law that essentially condones 
and safeguards discrimination. 
At oral argument, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan asked Hobby Lobby to 
clarify the scope of its claims.268  Justice Sotomayor asked whether its claim 
was limited to contraceptives, or whether it includes other “items like blood 
transfusion[s], vaccines . . . [or] products made of pork?”269  Could “any 
claim . . . that has a religious basis . . . [allow] an employer [to] preclude the 
use of those items as well?”270  “Does the creation of the exemption relieve 
me from paying taxes when I have a sincere religious belief that taxes are 
immoral?”271  In response to Justices Sotomayor and Kagans’ hypotheticals 
about the limits of Hobby Lobby’s theory, counsel refocused the Court’s 
analysis to the strict scrutiny test, arguing that in every factual instance 
(vaccines, blood transfusions, pork products, and even taxes) the central 
analysis is whether the Mandate is the least restrictive means of achieving a 
 
 266. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 267. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).   
 268. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 21, at 4–5. 
 269. Id. at 4.   
 270. Id.  
 271. Id. at 85. 
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compelling government interest.272  Justice Kagan pointed out that this 
highly fact-intensive, case-by-case approach could yield inconsistent 
holdings, allowing “one religious group [to] opt out of this and another 
religious group [to] opt out of that and everything would be 
piecemeal . . . .”273 
In fact, while the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs objected to only four of the 
twenty FDA-approved contraceptives covered by the Mandate,274 and the 
Conestoga Woods plaintiffs objected to only two of the twenty,275 the 300-
plus plaintiffs in the other 102 lawsuits take issue with a hodgepodge of 
drugs and treatments covered by the Mandate that are not presently at issue 
before the Court.276  While the slippery slope concerns raised by Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan are real and present imminent factual and legal 
dilemmas, a larger legal quagmire looms in the background. 
In September 2006, Vanessa Willock e-mailed the Albuquerque, New 
Mexico photo studio, Elane Photography, indicating that she was 
researching potential photographers to capture her same-sex commitment 
ceremony.277  Elaine Huguenin responded with the following statement: “As 
a company, we photograph traditional weddings, engagements, seniors, and 
several other things such as political photographs and singer portfolios.”278  
In response, Ms. Willock asked for clarification, inquiring whether the 
company “does not offer [its] photography services to same-sex 
couples[.]”279  In their final e-mail exchange, Elane Photography wrote, 
“Yes, you are correct in saying we do not photograph same-sex 
 
 272. Id. at 5–6, 21. 
 273. Id. at 6. 
 274. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1144 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 275. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 724 
F.3d 377, 382 (3d Cir. 2013).  
 276. See BECKET FUND, HHS MANDATE INFORMATION CENTRAL, supra note 28; e.g., Little 
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 13-CV-2611-WJM-BNB, 2013 WL 6839900, at 
*4 (D. Colo. 2013) (objecting to contraceptives including abortifacient contraceptives, sterilization 
procedures, and related education and counseling); Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1292 
(D. Colo. 2012) (objecting to all of the FDA-approved contraceptives covered by the Mandate); 
Roman Catholic Archdiocese v. Sebelius, 907 F. Supp. 2d 310, 316 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (same).   
 277. Defendant Vanessa Willock’s Memorandum Brief in Support of her Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 2, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632, 2009 WL 8747805 (N.M. 
Dist. Dec. 11, 2009) (No. CV 08 6632), aff’d, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. App. 2012), aff’d, 309 P.3d 53 
(N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
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weddings . . . .”280 
Co-owners of Elane Photography, Elaine and her husband John 
Huguenin, “object as a matter of conscience to creating pictures or books 
that will tell stories or convey messages contrary to their deeply held 
religious beliefs.”281  Among their convictions is the premise that marriage 
“is the union of a man and a woman.”282 
Following Ms. Willock’s charge of discrimination, the New Mexico 
Human Rights Commission (Commission) held that Elane Photography had 
engaged in an illegal act of sexual orientation discrimination by a public 
accommodation in violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act 
(NMHRA).283  After multiple appeals in state court, in which Elane 
Photography advanced a variety of arguments premised upon alleged 
violations of the company’s free speech and free exercise rights,284 the New 
Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings that Elane 
Photography had violated the NMHRA by unlawfully discriminating against 
Ms. Willock on the basis of her sexual orientation.285 
During the course of the litigation, Elane Photography advanced three 
basic constitutional arguments.286  First, Elane Photography argued that a 
proper interpretation of the NMHRA prohibited discrimination only on the 
basis of a protected status (here, Ms. Willock’s sexual orientation), as 
opposed to “conduct closely correlated with that status.”287  The New 
Mexico Supreme Court rejected Elane Photography’s theory that the 
participation in a same-sex commitment ceremony was unprotected 
“conduct” because it was “inextricably tied” to Ms. Willock’s sexual 
orientation and thus protected by the NMHRA.288 
 
 280. Id. 
 281. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 134 S. Ct. 1787 
(2014) (No. 13-585).   
 282. Id. at 6. 
 283. Id. at i. 
 284. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428, 433 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). 
 285. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 60 (N.M. 2013). 
 286. See id. at 60. 
 287. Id. at 61.   
 288. Id. at 62 (citing Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law 
v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980 (2010), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) 
(“When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of 
itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination.” (emphases added in Elane 
Photography))).  See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.   
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Next, Elane Photography argued that its status as a commercial, for-
profit entity did not diminish its First Amendment rights, and the 
Commission’s enforcement of the NMHRA here constituted unlawful 
compelled speech in violation of those rights.289  Specifically, relying on the 
premise that photography is inherently expression laden and deserving of 
First Amendment protection, Elane Photography argued: 
The Commission’s actions forcing Elane Photography either to 
photograph . . . same-sex commitment ceremonies or to suffer 
punishment compels the Company to express messages with which 
it vehemently disagrees, namely, that marriage can exist between 
anyone other than one man and one woman, and that same-sex 
romantic relationships are morally acceptable.290   
Arguing that the Supreme Court’s precedent in Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.291 controlled, they contended 
that this constituted impermissible compelled speech, which could not 
survive the highly burdensome strict scrutiny test.292 
Finally, Elane Photography argued that the NMHRA violated its First 
Amendment right to freely exercise its religion.293  Because public 
accommodation laws apply to “nearly all [businesses and] forms of 
‘business activity’” and protect a “broadened . . . scope” of covered 
classifications,294 Elane Photography recognized an inherent tension between 
secular business owners’ political and religious views and public 
accommodation laws that, from its perspective, forces business owners to 
express or endorse ideas that are contrary to their deeply held religious 
beliefs.295  Relying on these principles, Elane Photography invoked a 
 
 289. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 25–26, 
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. CV-2008-06632, 2009 WL 8747805 (N.M. Dist. Dec. 11, 
2009) (No. CV 08 6632).    
 290. Id. at 25.   
 291. 515 U.S. 557, 568–81 (1995) (holding that state public accommodation law’s requirement 
that organizers of parade be required to allow gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of Irish 
immigrants to march altered the expressive content of the parade and thus violated the organizers’ 
First Amendment rights). 
 292. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
289, at 27–28.   
 293. Id. at 29–35. 
 294. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 281, at 21.   
 295. Id. at 21–22.   
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statutory exemption to the NMHRA, 296 which it maintained allowed certain 
“religious organizations” to essentially “decline same-sex couples as 
customers.”297 
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged that 
“[e]xemptions for religious organizations are common in a wide variety of 
laws, and they reflect the attempts of the Legislature to respect free exercise 
rights by reducing legal burdens on religion,” it ultimately held that Elane 
Photography’s reading of the NMHRA’s statutory exemptions was overly 
broad.298  The court clarified that the sections relied upon by Elane 
Photography merely grant religious organizations an exemption from 
providing faith-based services to certain individuals and allow them to 
refuse to hire or engage in real estate transactions with certain individuals 
based on their deeply held religious beliefs.299  However, as the court 
explained, the exemptions do not generally allow religious organizations “to 
turn away same-sex couples while catering to opposite-sex couples of all 
faiths,” and thus they do not excuse Elane Photography’s refusal to serve 
Ms. Willock.300 
Although the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari,301 the arguments in 
Elane Photography foreshadow a potential risky slippery slope.  In fact, 
since Elane Photography, scorned patrons of several other wedding-related 
businesses have filed similar lawsuits, claiming that the businesses’ refusal 
to serve them violated state anti-discrimination laws.302  For example, in 
Ingersoll v. Arlene Flowers,303 a same-sex couple sued a florist for refusing 
to provide flowers for their commitment ceremony, claiming a violation of 
 
 296. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
289, at 32–33 (citing NEW MEX. STAT. § 28-1-9(B), (C) (2013) (providing that the NMHRA shall 
not “bar any religious . . . organization . . . from limiting admission to or giving preference to 
persons of the same religion or denomination or from making selections of buyers, lessees or tenants 
as are calculated by the organization or denomination to promote the religious or denominational 
principles for which it is established or maintained . . . or . . . from imposing discriminatory 
employment or renting practices that are based upon sexual orientation or gender identity”)). 
 297. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 74 (N.M. 2013). 
 298. Id. at 74–75. 
 299. Id. at 74. 
 300. Id.  
 301. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).   
 302. See infra notes 303–07 and accompanying text. 
 303. Ingersoll v. Arlene Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00943-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 18, 2013). 
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Washington State’s Law Against Discrimination.304  Similarly, in Baker v. 
Hands On Originals, Inc.,305 a gay and lesbian organization sued a Christian 
t-shirt company for refusing to print t-shirts for the organization because 
Hands On disagreed with the organization’s message.306  These cases and 
others suggest a growing trend in which for-profit businesses are invoking 
their deeply held religious beliefs to excuse themselves from serving gay and 
lesbian customers.307 
Even more concerning is the fact that numerous states have proposed or 
passed their own RFRA laws that essentially grant religious employers a 
waiver from complying with state public accommodations laws.308  Indeed, 
in Alabama, Rhode Island, Illinois, Tennessee, and several other states, 
lawmakers have provided an easy statutory out for those employers that 
 
 304. Complaint at 4, Ingersoll v. Arlene Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00943-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. filed 
Apr. 18, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/complaint_-
_intersoll_v_arlenes_flowers_21.pdf.   
 305. Baker v. Hands On Originals, Inc., HRC No. 03-12-3135 (Lexington-Fayette Urban County 
Human Rights Comm’n, Oct. 6, 2014), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/HOOrecommend 
ation.pdf. 
 306. See ADF: KY. T-shirt Company Not Required to Promote Message It Disagrees With, 
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.adfmedia.org/news/prdetail/5454.  
Hands On instead referred the organization to a different vendor that would produce the shirts for the 
same price.  Id.  The organization filed a complaint with the Lexington-Fayette Urban Human Rights 
Commission claiming discrimination based on “sexual orientation.”  Id.  
 307. See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, CR 2013-0008 (Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, May 
30, 2014), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/masterpiece_--
_commissions_final_order.pdf.  A summary of the case is available at the ACLU’s website: 
https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/charlie-craig-and-david-mullins-v-masterpiece-cakeshop.  Craig 
and Mullins sued Jack C. Phillips, owner of the Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., for refusing to sell them 
a wedding cake because of their sexual orientation, which violated a longstanding Colorado state 
law.  Id.; see also, e.g., Sasha Aslanian, Same-Sex Couple Settles in Rice Creek Lodge Wedding 
Dispute, MPR NEWS (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/08/22/gay-marriage-
lodge-dispute (discussing the settlement of a discrimination claim brought by a same-sex couple 
against a wedding venue in Minnesota for refusing to host the wedding). 
 308. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I § 3.01 (guaranteeing that “freedom of religion is not burdened 
by state and local law”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-80.1-3(b) (1997) (stating that a governmental 
authority may restrict a person’s free exercise of religion only if: “(1) the restriction is in the form of 
a rule of general applicability and does not intentionally discriminate against religion or among 
religions; and (2) the governmental authority proves that application of the restriction to the person 
is essential to further a compelling governmental interest, and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 253 (2000) (providing that 
“no government entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability” (emphasis added)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 
(West 2013) (“[N]o government entity shall substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” (emphasis added)).   
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object to providing accommodations on religious grounds.309  These laws, 
although well intentioned, effectively condone a new wave of 
discrimination. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Days after the Hobby Lobby oral argument, the media reported that 
Hobby Lobby’s retirement plan “holds $73 million in mutual funds with 
investments in companies that make abortion drugs.”310  Ironically, some of 
those companies manufacture the very contraceptives to which Hobby 
Lobby objects on religious grounds.311  The disclosure of Hobby Lobby 
investments almost “proves” the Government’s case.  Like contributions to 
its employer-provided health insurance plan, Hobby Lobby’s contribution to 
its retirement plan involves an undifferentiated payment for investments in 
mutual funds managed by third parties.312  Hobby Lobby has no more 
personal knowledge or connection to its employees’ use of insurance 
benefits for the offensive contraceptives than it has to its retirement plan 
investments.313 
The attenuation between Hobby Lobby’s asserted harm and the 
government mandate should matter.  With most injury claims, there must be 
a connection between the injury suffered and the alleged wrongful act.314  As 
to Hobby Lobby’s RFRA claim, the harm suffered is an infringement on its 
religious beliefs; this is akin to dignitary harm.315  But even for claims 
 
 309. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.   
 310. Gail Sullivan, Antiabortion Company Hobby Lobby Reportedly Invests Retirement Funds in 
Abortion Drugs, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/04/02/anti-abortion-company-hobby-lobby-reportedly-invests-retirement-funds-in-
abortion-drugs/.   
 311. Id.  The pharmaceutical companies include those that manufacture Plan B, a copper IUD, and 
other drugs commonly used in abortions or to induce abortions.  Id.  Further, Hobby Lobby’s 
retirement fund invests in two health insurance companies that cover surgical abortions.  Id.   
 312. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 
236, 248–49 (1986) (explaining that indirect financial support is not coercion). 
 314. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590 (1992) (“[A] plaintiff [must] 
allege (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and that 
is (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 315. Dignitary harm is “the affront to [a person’s] dignity as a human being, the damage to his 
self-image, and the resulting mental distress.”  FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1463 (2012) 
(quoting Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages Equity, Restitution § 7.1(1) (1973)) (internal 
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seeking redress for dignitary harms like defamation, a plaintiff must prove 
that the defamatory statements caused a loss in business, reputation, or good 
will.316 
Hobby Lobby contends that the Mandate compels endorsement or 
support of the use of certain contraceptives that violate deeply held religious 
views.  In actuality, however, the harm is the “possibility” of such 
endorsement or support, much like a taxpayer who objects to his portion of 
taxes funding certain government programs.317  Due to privacy laws, Hobby 
Lobby would never know if one of its 13,000 employees actually purchased 
the objected-to contraceptives with her insurance benefits.318  Like the 
mutual fund investments, the potential support of contraceptives is too 
attenuated from the compelled contribution of undifferentiated funds to an 
employer-provided insurance plan.319 
Granting an exemption to Hobby Lobby would deprive its employees 
who do not share the same religious beliefs as its owners from the benefits 
of a general regulatory scheme governing employer-sponsored health 
insurance plans.320  While Congress passed RFRA to reinstate strict scrutiny 
review to general laws that substantially burden free exercise rights,321 laws 
intended to provide uniform regulation of benefits to a vast group of 
Americans should not be subject to piecemeal application on the “idea” or 
“possibility” that compliance might cause third persons to act contrary to a 
religious claimant’s beliefs. 
Despite the battle cry for religious freedom, Hobby Lobby, like the vast 
 
quotation marks omitted). 
 316. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65 (1966) (“[A] 
complainant may not recover except upon proof of such harm, which may include general injury to 
reputation, consequent mental harm, alienation of associates, specific items of pecuniary loss or 
whatever form of harm would be recognized by state tort law.”). 
 317. See Jenkins v. Comm’r, 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that RFRA did not afford 
disgruntled taxpayer, who objected to the government’s spending taxpayer dollars for certain 
military activities, the right to avoid payment of taxes for religious reasons). 
 318. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 33; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.502; DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OCR PRIVACY BRIEF: SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE, 
available at http://www.hhs.ogv/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf 
(providing information on the privacy rule, including who is covered and what is individually 
identifiable health information). 
 319. See Sullivan, supra note 310.   
 320. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 5000 (2012) (imposing a tax on employers that contribute to 
nonconforming group health plans).   
 321. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(2) (2012). 
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majority of employers subject to the Mandate, is far removed from the actual 
payment for, distribution of, or decision to use contraceptives.322  If Hobby 
Lobby can be distanced from contributions to mutual funds that invest in the 
companies that manufacture the contraceptives to which it objects to on 
religious grounds, why is its RFRA claim not cured by the same distance 
between payments to an insurance plan and decisions by third parties to use 
benefits for the purchase of contraceptives?  Attenuation cannot be a shield 
for investment funds while at the same time failing to act as a buffer for 
contributions to an insurance plan that covers contraceptives. 
On the merits of its RFRA claim, Hobby Lobby should not prevail.  
Standing, however, should not be the decisional issue.  Because for-profit 
corporations enjoy many other constitutional rights, it is purely formalistic to 
draw a line between for-profit and nonprofit entities for purposes of free 
exercise rights, especially in this case.323  RFRA standing would not be 
questioned if the Greens operated their business as sole proprietors or a 
partnership; the fact of incorporation in and of itself should not affect 
standing.324  Further, many states have passed their own RFRA laws, 
expressly including for-profit corporations as “persons” who can bring 
claims under those state statutes.325  Therefore, the notion of for-profit 
corporations enjoying religious rights is apparently not novel. 
Hobby Lobby, however, has failed to show that the forced contribution 
to an insurance plan covering contraceptives for use by third parties causes a 
substantial burden on its free exercise rights.326  Despite exemptions and 
 
 322. See Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2013); see 
also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 33–34 (explaining that Hobby Lobby and the Greens are 
far removed from their employees’ decisions to purchase contraception).  
 323. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 18–19 (“There is no reason to think that 
Congress intended RFRA to grant for-profit corporations rights that previously had been reserved to 
individuals and religious non-profit institutions.  For-profit companies are different from religious 
non-profits in that they use labor to make a profit, rather than to perpetuate a religious values-based 
mission.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 324. But cf. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 27–28 (“RFRA grants the Greens as 
individuals no right to challenge an obligation that applies only to the corporate respondents 
[because they] conduct business through corporations, thereby obtaining both the advantages and 
disadvantages of the corporate form.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 325. Compare supra note 308 (outling different states’ RFRA laws), with 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“In 
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress . . . the words “person” and “whoever” include 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as 
well as individuals . . . .”).   
 326. Contra Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (holding that, for 
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accommodations for other religious objectors and grandfathered plans, 
Hobby Lobby cannot satisfy the substantial burden element based on the 
recognition that others may be substantially burdened by the Mandate.327  
Religious exercise cases are individualized; they are not governed by the 
rule that a “duty to accommodate one” is a “duty to accommodate all.” 
Although the Mandate may not violate Hobby Lobby’s rights under 
RFRA,328 it is still problematic.  Hobby Lobby’s case and the 102 others329 
circulating in the federal courts may revive the nondelegation doctrine from 
its “dormant” status over the last eight decades.  When Congress insulates 
itself from voter retaliation by delegating its power to legislate to an 
administrative agency on controversial issues such as mandatory health 
insurance benefits for contraceptives,330 the issue is greater than the First 
Amendment.  Impermissible delegation of legislative authority, coupled with 
deference to administrative decision-making, threatens the constitutional 
structure, which guarantees separation of powers.331  An accretion of power 
in the “headless fourth branch of government”332 threatens all of our rights, 
not just religious freedom. 
Whether framed as a violation of RFRA or the First Amendment, free 
exercise claims are the latest attack on politically unpopular government 
laws.333  Politics and religion have clashed and Hobby Lobby will not be the 
last word on general laws—whether they involve mandated insurance 
coverage for contraceptives or the legalization of same-sex marriage—that 
offend the religious sensibilities of the “losing” side on these controversial 
issues. 
 
RFRA purposes, the HHS contraceptives mandate substantially burdened the for-profit, closely held 
corporation’s exercise of religion).   
 327. Contra id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In the Court's view, RFRA demands 
accommodation of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs no matter the impact that 
accommodation may have on third parties who do not share the corporation owners’ religious 
faith—in these cases, thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents 
of persons those corporations employ.”). 
 328. Contra id. at 2775.   
 329. See BECKET FUND, HHS MANDATE INFORMATION CENTRAL, supra note 28.   
 330. See supra Part V.  
 331. See supra Part V. 
 332. City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013). 
 333. See supra Part VI.   
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VIII. ADDENDUM334 
On June 30, 2014, in a five-to-four decision, the Court held that, as to a 
closely held corporation like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Woods, the 
Mandate violates RFRA.335  Justice Alito, writing for the majority, had little 
trouble concluding that a for-profit closely held corporation has standing 
under RFRA.336  The Court reached its conclusion by applying the 
Dictionary Act definition of “person,” which clearly includes artificial 
entities, and determining that Congress intended RFRA to have broad 
application.337  Because the government already conceded that nonprofit 
religious entities would have standing under RFRA,338 the Court saw little 
distinction between that type of artificial entity and the closely held 
corporations of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Woods, both created and 
operated with a religious mission.339 
The majority and dissenting opinions disagreed about the scope of 
RFRA.340  In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg opined that Congress’ intent in 
passing RFRA was to reinstate pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence.341  
Finding no pre-Smith precedent recognizing a for-profit corporation’s free 
exercise right, Justice Ginsburg held that Hobby Lobby was not a “person” 
under RFRA.342  Further, she articulated a clear distinction between a 
nonprofit religious organization and a for-profit corporation: the former 
“exist[s] to serve a community of believers,” while the latter does not.343 
 
 334. The authors do not intend this addendum to be an exhaustive analysis of the Court’s 
opinions.   
 335. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014), aff’g Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 114 (10th Cir. 2013), and rev’g Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. 
v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013).  Note the change 
in party names due to Kathleen Sebelius’s resignation as Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services and her succession by Sylvia Burwell on April 11, 2014.  See Pace & Alonso-
Zaldivar, supra note 1.   
 336. 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
 337. Id. at 2768–69. 
 338. Id. at 2769 (citing Brief for Petitioners, supra note 103, at 17).   
 339. Id. at 2771. 
 340. Compare id. at 2768 (majority opinion), with id. at 2771 (dissenting opinion).   
 341. Id. at 2791–92 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 342. Id. at 2793 (“The Dictionary Act's definition . . . controls only where context does not 
indicate otherwise.  Here, context does so indicate.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).     
 343. Id. at 2796.  Justices Breyer and Kagan joined in the dissent except as to the standing issue.  
See id. at 2806.  They conclude that the question of whether for-profit corporations have standing 
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It was undisputed that Hobby Lobby’s objection to the contraceptives at 
issue was based on a sincerely held religious belief; thus, the Court’s 
analysis turned to the substantial burden prong of RFRA.344  Recognizing 
that Hobby Lobby faced a “Hobson’s choice” of either paying hefty fines or 
violating its religious beliefs, the Court concluded that the Mandate imposed 
a substantial burden on Hobby Lobby’s exercise of religion.345  The Court 
gave no credence to the argument that Hobby Lobby had the option to 
forego employee health insurance and, instead, pay the $2,000 per employee 
penalty, if applicable.346  Because it was not briefed and argued, the Court 
ignored the possibility that such an option might have a net zero financial 
consequence, thus alleviating any substantial burden to Hobby Lobby.347  
Finally, the Court refused to consider the factors of attenuation and the 
denial of benefits to third parties348 in its substantial burden analysis.349  In 
fact, the Court concluded that a consideration of such factors would be akin 
to the Court questioning the reasonableness of Hobby Lobby’s religious 
beliefs.350 
To the contrary, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority’s conclusory 
analysis that any neutral regulation impacting a sincerely held religious 
belief automatically satisfies the substantial burden prong of RFRA.351  
According to the dissent, the majority collapsed the two inquiries required to 
establish that a religious belief is substantially burdened into one flawed, 
 
under RFRA need not be decided because the RFRA claim is invalid on the merits.  Id.  
 344. Id. at 2775–79.   
 345. Id. at 2775–76. 
 346. Id. at 2776. 
 347. Id.  
 348. See supra Part IV.B.2. (discussing the attenuation and imposition on third-party beneficiary 
arguments). 
 349. 134 S. Ct. at 2777–78. 
 350. Id. at 2778 (“[The Government’s attenuation] argument dodges the question that RFRA 
presents (whether the Mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to 
conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs ) and instead addresses a very different 
question that the federal courts have no business addressing (whether the religious belief asserted in 
a RFRA case is reasonable).”).   
 351. Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court failed to engage in a legal 
analysis of whether Hobby Lobby’s religious exercise is substantially burdened; instead, it “rests on 
the [plaintiffs’] belief that providing the coverage . . . is connected to the destruction of an embryo in 
a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the coverage.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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broad-sweeping analysis.352  First, there are the “factual allegations that 
[plaintiffs’] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature.”353  Justice Ginsburg 
agreed with the majority that the Court “must accept [these] as true.”354  
Second, is the “‘legal conclusion . . . that [plaintiffs’] religious exercise is 
substantially burdened,’ an inquiry which the court must undertake.”355 
This difference of opinion regarding the rigor with which the substantial 
burden prong must be analyzed resurfaced three days later in the Court’s 
Wheaton College v. Burwell356 decision.357  As a prelude to understanding the 
impact of Wheaton College, however, it is necessary to discuss the clash 
between the majority and dissenting opinions in Hobby Lobby on the least 
restrictive means test. 
Once Hobby Lobby cleared the standing and substantial burden hurdles, 
the burden shifted to the Government to demonstrate that the Mandate 
served a compelling government interest, which the Court assumed without 
deciding,358 and that the Mandate was the least restrictive way to meet that 
interest.359  The majority easily concluded that, because there was already a 
less restrictive alternative accommodating nonprofit religious entities 
available,360 the government could apply this accommodation to Hobby 
Lobby or, alternatively, the government could pay for the contraceptives 
itself.361  Despite the fact that the parties did not brief or argue whether this 
accommodation would be available to or acceptable to Hobby Lobby,362 this 
 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. (quoting Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 354. Id.   
 355. Id. (quoting Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 679) (alteration in original).   
 356. 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).   
 357. Id. at 2807 (indicating that Wheaton College was decided on June 30, 2014).   
 358. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (“We find it unnecessary to 
adjudicate this issue . . . [and] will assume that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the 
four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA . . . .”).   
 359. Id.; see also supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the strict scrutiny analysis and the arguments 
raised by the parties). 
 360. Cf. Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2807 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Any religious 
nonprofit is also exempt [from the HHS Mandate requiring insurance coverage to employees, 
without cost-sharing, for contraceptives], as long as it signs a form certifying that it is a religious 
nonprofit that objects to the provision of contraceptive services, and provides a copy of that form to 
its insurance issuer or third-party administrator.”).   
 361. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2780–82. 
 362.  See id. at 2776, 2780–81.  The majority was unwilling to entertain the argument that Hobby 
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accommodation served as the lynchpin of the Court’s conclusion that the 
Mandate was not the least restrictive alternative and, therefore, violated 
RFRA.363 
Three days after its decision in Hobby Lobby, the Court granted 
injunctive relief to Wheaton College’s claim that the self-certification 
procedure for opting out of the Mandate—the very accommodation that the 
majority relied upon in Hobby Lobby364—violates RFRA.365  The Court has 
deemed injunctive relief an extraordinary remedy.366  To grant injunctive 
relief before deciding the merits of a petitioner’s claim requires a showing 
that the right to relief, on the merits, is “indisputably clear.”367  A majority of 
the Court apparently agreed that, on the merits, the accommodation 
requiring self-certification to opt out of the Mandate violates RFRA.368  The 
keystone of the Hobby Lobby decision was that the government already had 
an accommodation in place.369  If the majority of the Court now concludes 
that the accommodation likely violates RFRA, then its opinion in Hobby 
Lobby was smoke and mirrors.370 
In a scathing dissent, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority’s 
decision to grant injunctive relief as “undermin[ing] confidence in this 
institution.”371   
After expressly relying on the availability of the religious-nonprofit 
accommodation to hold that the contraceptive coverage requirement 
violates RFRA as applied to closely held for-profit corporations, the 
Court now, as the dissent in Hobby Lobby feared it might, retreats 
from that position.  That action evinces disregard for even the 
 
Lobby could alleviate any burden the Mandate imposed with a potentially cost-neutral option 
(forego insurance and pay a penalty) because the parties had not briefed and argued the issue.  Id. at 
2776.  But the absence of briefing and arguing regarding whether the accommodation to nonprofit 
religious entities would be available and acceptable to Hobby Lobby as a less restrictive alternative 
did not give pause to the Court.  Id.   
 363. Id. at 2780–83.   
 364. Id. at 2782.   
 365. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).   
 366. Id. at 2808; see also Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2201, 2219 (2008). 
 367. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).   
 368. See id.   
 369. See id. at 2813 (discussing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2782). 
 370. See id.   
 371. Id. at 2808.   
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newest of this Court’s precedents . . . .372 
The Wheaton College decision continues Hobby Lobby’s evisceration of 
any rigor required to sustain a RFRA claim.  The government granted 
Wheaton College an accommodation to opt out of the Mandate, but Wheaton 
College alleged that filling out the form enabling its insurance carrier or 
third party administrator to provide coverage for the objected to 
contraceptives substantially burdens its free exercise of religion.373  
Essentially, Wheaton College “believes that authorizing its [third-party 
administrator] to provide these drugs in [its] place makes it complicit in 
grave moral evil.”374 
In Wheaton College, once again, the Court elided a RFRA claimant’s 
allegations that it sincerely holds a religious belief with the legal conclusion 
that the claimant’s religious belief is substantially burdened by a neutral 
government regulation.375  However, Wheaton College’s argument goes one 
step further than Hobby Lobby’s: it claims that RFRA is violated by 
someone else having to fulfill the Mandate in its stead.376  If this is likely to 
satisfy a RFRA claim, it is hard to imagine what would not. 
To illustrate how attenuated Wheaton College’s claim is, Justice 
Sotomayor quotes an analogy from the Seventh Circuit.377  In short, the 
analogy poses a hypothetical conscientious objector to the draft opposing the 
drafting of another person to go to war in his place.378  Obviously, a 
conscientious objector would have no legal basis to question the draft as it 
applied to another young person.  Similarly, RFRA provides no legal basis 
to establish that the procedure accommodating Wheaton College 
substantially burdens its religious beliefs simply because a third party must 
now provide the objected-to coverage.379 
Like in Hobby Lobby, the dissent in Wheaton College considered a less 
restrictive means for the government to achieve its objective—“let the 
 
 372. Id. (citations omitted).   
 373. Id. at 2812.   
 374. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at 2808 (majority opinion). 
 377. Id. at 2812–13 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting analogy from Univ. of Notre Dame v. 
Sebelius, 734 F.3d 547, 556 (2014)).   
 378. Id. (discussing Notre Dame, 734 F.3d at 556).   
 379. Id. at 2813–14. 
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government pay.”380  As a result of Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College, the 
accommodation crafted for nonprofit religious entities—once thought to be a 
viable accommodation for closely held corporations—likely no longer 
exists.  The alternative, as suggested in Hobby Lobby, is for the government 
to pay for the cost of the contraceptives that employers do not want to 
include in their insurance plans.381  In Wheaton College, the Court suggested 
that a less restrictive alternative to the self-certification procedure is to send 
a letter to HHS.382  In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor explained why the “let 
the government pay” approach is not a viable alternative.383 
The Court’s newly crafted government solutions to the Hobby Lobby 
and Wheaton College RFRA claims raise an issue of separation of powers.384  
It is not the Court’s role to devise government plans to implement and 
enforce policy.385  As the Mandate unravels under the force of Hobby Lobby 
and Wheaton College, congressional action may be the only salvation.  
Although the President is considering executive authority to provide the 
contraceptives to women denied those benefits based on their employers’ 
religious beliefs,386 such a government plan would likely entail expenditures 
that Congress would have to approve.387 
The Mandate and any accommodations or exemptions to it would have 
greater force if Congress speaks directly.388  Although HHS has the expertise 
 
 380. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2802 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 381. Id. at 2781 (majority opinion) (“The most straightforward way of doing this would be for the 
Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are 
unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers’ religious 
objections.”). 
 382. Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2807. 
 383. Id. at 2814–15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 384. See supra Part V. 
 385. See Wheaton Coll., 134 S. Ct. at 2814–15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“It is unclear why the 
Court goes to the lengths it does to rewrite HHS’s regulations.”).   
 386. Benjamin Goad & Ferdous Al-Faruque, Obama Weighs Executive Hammer, THE HILL (July 
1, 2014, 6:01 AM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/211022-obama-weighs-executive-
hammer; see also Robert Pear, Democrats Push Bill to Reverse Supreme Court Ruling on 
Contraceptives, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/us/politics/ 
democrats-draft-bill-to-override-contraception-ruling.html?emc=edit_tnt_20140708&nlid=48778543 
&tntemail0=y&_r=1 (discussing potential legislative action to override the impact of the Hobby 
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 387. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (limiting federal government employees from making 
expenditures without congressional authorization). 
 388. See supra Part V. 
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to decide healthcare priorities, when it comes to contraceptives, which are 
intrinsically linked to abortion and religion, Congress should speak 
explicitly and not insulate itself from controversial policy decisions by 
administrative delegation.389 
Finally, these cases intensify the slippery slope concerns discussed 
above.390  Although Elane Photography was unsuccessful at discriminating 
against a same-sex married couple based on religious freedom and free 
speech grounds, it will not be long before a similar claim will succeed.391  
Both Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College have opened the floodgates for 
RFRA claims.392  The substantial burden element of a RFRA claim is easy to 
establish based on the Court’s deference to a claimant’s sincerely held 
religious belief as proof positive that any impact by a neutral government 
regulation satisfies the substantial burden test.393  Further, the Court’s 
willingness to create government-sponsored programs out of whole cloth as 
a least restrictive alternative suggests that the RFRA strict scrutiny analysis 
is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”394 
Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College may signal the unraveling of the 
Mandate, but they are not the final word.  Government mandated employer-
sponsored health insurance remains controversial, and even more 
controversy surrounds the Mandate.  Creating constitutional rules, whether 
framed in RFRA or the First Amendment, to dismantle a politically 
unpopular or divisive comprehensive insurance scheme thus thrusts the 
Court into the political fray.  Contradicting its three-day-old Hobby Lobby 
opinion, the majority’s decision in Wheaton College suggests that the Court 
itself is not immune from the politics of Obamacare and the Mandate, which, 




 389. See supra Part V.  
 390. See supra Part VI. 
 391. See supra Part VI. 
 392. See supra Part VI. 
 393. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 394. Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact”), with Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict 
scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519)).   
 395. Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2808 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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